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Chapter 1
Introduction
China has the largest thermal power sector in the world, which consumes vast amounts
of fossil fuel, and is ranked first in terms of air pollution emissions. In 2014, the discharge of
SO2, NOx, and dust pollutants in the thermal power sector were 6.2, 7.13, and 4.27 million
ton (ESY, 2014) respectively. These air pollutions may cause environmental damage and are
linked to a number of adverse e↵ects on the human respiratory system.
To control air pollution in the thermal power sector, the government issued The Envi-
ronmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China on December 26, 1989. Since
then, various emission standards have been issued. Under GB13223-91, for example, the
Chinese government designated a national standard for pollution emissions from this sec-
tor. A variety of other environmental policies have also been implemented to control the
discharge of air pollution from this sector. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection announced policies to install control equipment for pollution abatement,
and the National Energy Administration issued policies to improve energy e ciency and
reduce energy consumption. The Chinese government strengthened its e↵orts to control SO2
emissions during the 11th Five-year Plan period (2006–2010), and began serious e↵orts to
reduce NOx emission in the 12th Five-year Plan period (2011–2015). Due to the successful
implementation of these policies, the total amount of SO2 and NOx emissions have been
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decreasing in recent years.
The thesis studies the e↵ectiveness of policies in reducing energy consumption and emis-
sions from the thermal power sector. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of policy measures on
reducing SO2 emissions during the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan of China (2006–2010).
By using a provincial-level panel data set, this chapter finds that the installation of the
flue-gas desulfurization equipment and closure of small coal-fired power plants contributed
to a statistically significant reduction in SO2 emissions. While estimation results suggest
that these two policy measures played an important role in reducing SO2 emissions in China
during this period, the size of the estimated coe cients shows that the e↵ects might have
been weaker than those predicted by ex-ante cost-benefit analysis. In addition, results of the
panel threshold models show that the level of economic development in each province might
influence the e↵ectiveness of pollution control technology.
Chapter 3 investigates the choices of denitration technology in this thermal power sec-
tor. Using a multinominal logit model of the choices among 1,135 boilers in thermal power
plants operating in China in 2013, the chapter analyzes how the choices were influenced by
government policies, the stringency of national standards, and subsidies for using specific
technology. The results are as follows. First, China’s 12th Five-year Plan might make it
more attractive for power plants to choose the cheapest denitration technology among the
three options examined in this study. Second, technology choices di↵ered significantly by
region before the 12th Five-year Plan period. These regional di↵erences have disappeared
recently, perhaps due to the economic development across all regions of China. Third, elec-
tricity price subsidies o↵ered to plants that use denitration equipment might a↵ect their
technology choice. These results suggest that plants might choose the cheapest technology
available, in order to lower investment costs.
Chapter 4 investigates the e↵ect of air pollution control in the thermal power sector during
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (BOG08). By using data on pollution control equipment
and energy intensity, we assess if there are significant di↵erences in the levels of these mea-
2
sures related to pollution when comparing the provinces under the regional control policy
for BOG08 with the other provinces. Our results indicate that energy intensity of thermal
power plants improved in 2007 and 2008 in provinces designated as areas that required a
coordinated air pollution control policy for the Olympic Games. On the other hand, such
treatment e↵ects during BOG08 are almost negligible for pollution control equipment.
3
Chapter 2
Policies for Controlling SO2 emissions
and its e↵ects
2.1 Introduction
More than 20 million tons of SO2 were emitted in China in 2011, three times higher
than that in the United States in the same year (National Bureau of Statistics of China,
2012).1 SO2 is a major source of atmospheric haze and acid deposition, and it has been
linked to a number of adverse e↵ects on the human respiratory system (Nielsen and Ho,
2007; World Bank., 1997; Venners et al., 2003). World Bank (2007) estimates that the cost
of air pollution in China was 157.3 billion RMB in 2003, or 1.16% of GDP.2 The largest
contributor of SO2 emissions in China is coal-fired power generation. Chinese thermal power
sector discharges 40% of total SO2 while supplying more than 80% of electricity (Department
of Energy Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). Among the electricity
produced by thermal power plant, 87% is produced by coal.
One challenge for the Chinese government over the past 20 years has been to reduce
1According to OECD (2015), there were 5.85 million tons of sulfur oxides emissions in the United States
in 2011.
2As of January 2003, 1 US dollar was 8.28 RMB.
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SO2 discharges. A limit on total national emissions of SO2 was first introduced in the 9th
Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) (JES 2007). The emissions target in 2000 of 27.1 million tons
was easily achieved, with total SO2 emissions accounting for 22 million tons. In the following
10th Five-Years Plan, the total emissions control target was set as a 10% reduction from
2000 emission levels by 2005. However, actual emissions in 2005 increased by 27.8% from
that in 2000 against a backdrop of rapid economic growth with the average GDP growth
rate of 9.5%. Following this experience, the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) implemented
more ambitious policies to reduce SO2 emissions. Total SO2 emissions began to decrease in
2006 (Figure 2.1). Between 2006 and 2010, total SO2 emissions declined by more than 14%,
despite the economy growing annually by more than 10% on average. Hence, in terms of
total SO2 emissions, the o cial statistics suggests that China has passed the turning point
of the environmental Kuznets curve (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
[Figure 2.1]
There are some ex-ante evaluation of air pollution control in China during the 11th Five-
Year Plan period. JES (2007) provides a cost-benefit analysis of China’s energy saving and
SO2 control policies during this period, concluding that the abatement of SO2 emissions
of the 11th Five-Year Plan will lead to significant improvements in air quality in Chinese
cities. The estimation results show that the benefit-cost ratio is more than 5 to 1. Indeed,
quantifiable benefits reach 4.7 billion US dollars compared with costs of only 950 million
US dollars. Cao et al. (2009) extend JES (2007) by using a CGE model of the Chinese
economy. Their simulation results show that the overall impacts of the 11th Five-Year Plan’s
SO2 reduction policies is a 0.48% increase in GDP in 2010 above the baseline. They find
that the productivity improvement generated by the closure of small-unit coal-fired power
plants o↵sets the decline in GDP resulting from the installation of the flue-gas desulfurization
(FGD) equipment. While these studies suggest that command-and-control regulations might
have been e↵ective for reducing SO2 emissions in China, no study has thus far conducted a
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thorough ex-post evaluation of the policy measures taken during this period.3
This chapter examines how policy measures might have played a role in reducing SO2
emissions in Chinese provinces between 2006 and 2010. the chapter focuses on the poli-
cies promulgated in National Acid Rain and SO2 Pollution Control in 11th Five-Year Plan
and discuss how they contributed to control emissions from coal-fired power plants in each
province. Special attention is paid to the e↵ect of two policies: the installation of FGD
equipment and closure of small coal-fired power plants. the chapter also controls for the
impact of other policies introduced before the period (e.g., pollution levy and Two Con-
trol Zones (TCZ) policy), regional variation in sulfur content in the coal used in coal-fired
power plants, and improvement in energy e ciency for the power generation sector that
has occurred during the period. In addition, the chapter examines the e↵ect of economic
development on the e↵ectiveness of the installation of FGD equipment, by using a panel
threshold model.
The contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the chapter
investigates the impact of SO2 control policies on the coal-fired power sector in China’s
11th Five-Year Plan. Although several studies have evaluated the pollution control in the
same period (JES, 2007; Cao et al., 2009), econometric analyses are scarce. Since the SO2
emissions started to decrease during this period, empirical analysis of the role of policy in-
struments has significant implications for understanding the mechanism behind the turning
point of the environmental Kuznets curve. Secondly, we empirically examine the extent to
which a technological intervention for pollution control is e↵ective. Since our dataset on
the installation of control equipment contains information of the reduction capacity, we can
examine whether the installation of FGD equipment successfully led to actual reductions.
Thirdly, the chapter investigates the role of policies for small-scale power plants. The gov-
ernment issued requirements to close small, ine cient electric power generating units and
3The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing might have been a driving force behind the strict regulation
introduced in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Chen et al. (2013) evaluate the impact of policy measures on
improving air quality to prepare for the Olympic Games.
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replace them with larger, more e cient plants. This policy improves energy e ciency as well
as reduces SO2 emissions, and thus might be e↵ective as an e cient command-and-control
policy instrument. Fourthly, the chapter investigate how the level of economic development
might influence the e↵ectiveness of pollution control technology. Our results suggest that
there is a threshold of GRP per capita, beyond that the e↵ectiveness of FGD installation
significantly higher. More stringent monitoring and enforcement activity might play a role
behind the observation.
The remainder of the paper structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I explain the Chinese
policy for controlling SO2 during the 11th Five-Year Plan period. Section 2.3 introduces
the empirical model and data. The empirical results are presented in Section 2.4. Section
2.5 employs a threshold model and investigates possible structural breaks in terms of the
installation of FGD equipment. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Chinese policies for controlling SO2 emissions
As mentioned in the Introduction, China’s 11th Five-Year Plan included two major poli-
cies to control SO2 emissions: the installation of FGD equipment and closure of small power
plants. In 2007, the National Acid Rain and SO2 Pollution Control program was issued
(SEPA and NDRC, 2007; Cao et al., 2009). The plan specified emissions targets for 2010
for each province that ranged from a reduction of 25.9% from the 2005 level for Shanghai to
simply maintaining the 2005 levels in Hainan and other provinces. It also included sched-
ules for installing 167 GW of new FGD equipment at coal-fired power plants and listed 679
small power plants targeted for closure in order to remove more than 50 GW of electricity
generation capacity.
According to JES (2007), the expected net reduction in SO2 emissions was 5.4 million
tons from the installation of FGD equipment and 2.1 million tons from the closure policy.
The annualized benefits were estimated to be 35.4 billion RMB. The annualized cost estimate
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for the FGD equipment was 7.15 billion RMB and that of the closure policy was assumed
to be zero. Since these small power plants are ine cient and highly pollution-intensive, the
e↵ectiveness of closure policy is expected to be high.
Many power plants installed FGD equipment during this period (Schreifels et al., 2012).
The percentage of coal-fired power plants that had FGD rose from 14% in 2005 to 86% by the
end of 2010. However, the operation and performance of FGD equipment was insu cient.
Field inspections in early 2007 by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), which
was replaced by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008, revealed that less than
40% of the installed FGD equipment was running continuously and reliably (Xu, 2009). High
operation costs might have been the main reason for this inactiveness.
Despite these limitations, SO2 emissions in 2010 declined by 14% from 2005 levels, ex-
ceeding the reduction target of 10%. Schreifels et al. (2012) point out that several factors
contributed to this reversal from the environmental policies in the 10th and 11th Five-Year
Plans. Firstly, the reduction target was taken more seriously in the higher level of politi-
cal agenda. The goal of a 10% reduction was included in the Outline of the National 11th
Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development issued by the the National People’s
Congress, whereas the previous goal was only listed in the National 10th Five-Year Plan for
Environmental Protection issued by SEPA. Secondly, the attainment of these environmental
goals was linked to the performance evaluation of local leaders.4 Indeed, the energy conser-
vation target (energy consumption per unit of GDP) accounted for 40 points out of the 100
points available for the quantitative assessment. Thirdly, the monitoring and enforcement
of environmental policy was strengthened. In 2006, SEPA established six regional supervi-
sion centers to supervise local governments and environmental protection bureaus in order
to prevent inadequate activities (Moore, 2011). It also established two new departments to
oversee the implementation and enforcement of SO2 emission targets.
4Zheng et al. (2014) investigates how proxies for greenness is included in promotion evaluation. Their
results suggest that facility expenditure variable is highly significant while air quality measures is less sig-
nificant. It supports the claim that the promotion criteria emphasize input-based performance rather than
output such as level of air quality.
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Economic incentives were also strengthened. The level of pollution levy for SO2 rose from
0.42 RMB/kg in 2004 to 1.26 RMB/kg in 2007 (OECD, 2007; JES, 2007). Further, the green
pricing program for electricity from FGD-equipped power plants was revised to focus on FGD
operation and performance. Since 2003, the Chinese government has applied an electricity
price premium for the electricity sector to encourage coal-fired power plant to install the
FGD equipment. In 2007, it even started to provide an incentive of 15 RMB/kWh for power
plants operating FGD equipment for 90% or more of total electricity generated, a penalty of
15 RMB/kWh for plants operating FGDs between 80% and 90% of total generation, and a
penalty of 75 RMB/kWh for plants operating FGDs less than 80% of the time (Cao et al.,
2009).
While our focus is on the above-mentioned policies implemented during the 11th five-
year plan, there is an important precedent as a measure for controlling SO2 emissions in
China: that is the TCZ policy implemented in 1998. The objective of this policy is to reduce
SO2 emissions in cities and areas with particularly high air pollution. Cities exceeding
specific standards were designated as either acid rain or SO2 pollution control zones, based
on their records in past years. The area covers 175 cities across 27 provinces in China, and
it accounted for around 60% of SO2 emissions in 1995 (Hao et al., 2001). The three main
policy measures embodied in the TCZ policy were closing the biggest polluters, reducing
the sulfur-content of coal, and burning cleaner coal-burning. While SO2 emissions in the
power sector increased by 1.5 times from 2000 to 2005 (Zhao et al, 2008), Hering and Poncet
(2014) find that the TCZ policy might have been e↵ective for reducing SO2 emissions. Other
studies have also pointed out the e↵ectiveness of the measures in the TCZ policy (He et al.,
2002; Xu et al., 2004).
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2.3 Empirical strategy and data
2.3.1 Empirical model
In this chapter, total SO2 emissions at province i in year t (Emissionit) are regressed on
two policies examined herein as well as on other variables as follows:
Emissionit = ↵ +  Policiesit +  Xit + ⇣i +  t + ✏it, (2.1)
where ⇣i and  t are the province-specific e↵ects and year-specific e↵ects, respectively.
Policiesit summarizes the installation of FGD equipment (FGDit) and closure of small
coal-fired power plants (Closurei). FGDit is the cumulative amount of planned reduction
in SO2 emissions owing to the installation of FGD equipment in province i in year t. SEPA
planned to install FGD equipment that can reduce 4.4 million tons of SO2 in 31 provinces
from 2006 to 2010. Closurei represents the closure of small coal-fired power plants to reduce
SO2 emissions in province i, measured in terms of electricity generation capacity. Small plants
have low fuel e ciency, and it is economically unreasonable to install expensive equipment
in them. Indeed, units smaller than 300 MW consume 25% of total coal fuel in the electricity
sector, but emit 54% of total SO2 emissions (Chen et al., 2014). Since we cannot identify
when each plant actually is closed during the period, we assume that all closures occurred
in 2006, the starting year of the policy. This means that Closurei takes the same value in
all periods after 2006.
Xit summarizes the control variables of five factors: pollution levy, fuel e ciency, gross
regional product (GRP) per capita, sulfur content in coal, and TCZ policy. The pollution levy
was among the earliest policy instruments adopted to address SO2 emissions from industrial
sources. We assume that the total pollution levy paid to the government in a province in the
prior year (Levyi,t 1) influences SO2 emissions. Fuel e ciency (E ciency it) is also related
to SO2 emissions. When average fuel e ciency improves by technological advancement, it
reduces SO2 emissions as long as total production remains the same. Therefore, I can expect
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a negative relation between fuel e ciency and SO2 emissions. We calculate E ciency it,
fuel e ciency in province i in year t, by dividing total electricity production by total coal
consumption in each province. GRP per capita (GRPit) represents the level of economic
development in each province. We assume that developed regions have higher SO2 emissions
than others. Contenti represents the percentage of average sulfur content in coal in province
i, which is used in coal-fired power plants. SO2 emissions are strongly related to the quality
of coal used in each province. Coal with a high sulfur content is widely used in provinces in
the southeast of China, whereas that with relatively lower sulfur content is used in northeast
China. The weighted average of sulfur content in all provinces is about 1.10% (Fridley et
al., 2013). World Bank (2003) estimates that low-sulfur coal increases firms’ total operating
costs, as it is 40–50% more expensive than high-sulfur coal. To control for the e↵ect of the
TCZ policy on SO2 emissions, we add a dummy variable TCZi into our models. TCZi takes
a value of 1 when the province has a city that is under the TCZ policy and 0 otherwise.
2.3.2 Data
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics. We use data for 31 provinces from 2005 to
2010,5 to investigate the impact of the 11th five-year plan from 2006 to 2010. Our data
set includes annual province-level information collected from the China Energy Statistical
Yearbook (CESY), China Environment Yearbook (CEY), China Energy Databook (CED),
China Statistical Yearbook on the Environment (CSYE), China Statistical Yearbook (CSY),
and National Acid Rain and SO2 Pollution Control in the 11th Five-Year Plan (Department
of Energy Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005–2010; Editorial Committee
of China Environment Yearbook, 2004–2010; Fridley et al., 2013; National Bureau of Statis-
tics and Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2004–2010; National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2005–2010; SEPA and NDRC, 2007).
This chapter uses the total SO2 emissions from CEY. According to CESY, coal accounted
5For some lagged variables, we use data from 2004.
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for over 80% of the primary energy supply in China in 2010 (Department of Energy Statistics,
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). The planned reduction through the installation
of FGD equipment and capacity reduction through the closure policy in each provinces are
taken from SEPA and NDRC (2007). Data for the pollution levy in each province are
taken from CEY for the corresponding year. In all major sources, the pollution levy of SO2
emissions increased from 0.42 RMB/kg in 2004 to 1.26 RMB/kg in 2007 (OECD, 2007; JES,
2007). GRP per capita is taken from CSY. The generating capacity of thermal plants and
coal consumption of coal-fired power plant in each province are sourced from CESY. Due
to data availability, we use the generating capacity of all thermal power plants instead of
that of coal-fired power plants. In 2012, approximately 66% of installed capacity for power
generation was at coal-fired power plants (Zhang, 2014). The sulfur content level of coal
is measured at the regional level: North, Northeast, East, South Central, Southwest, and
Northwest. We calculate the market share of coal that has a sulfur content lower than 3% in
each region (Fridley et al., 2013). Finally, we take the information on TCZ policy from Law
of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution.
[Table 2.1]
2.4 Empirical results
Firstly, we estimate a linear fixed e↵ects model, assuming the province e↵ects vi are
unobserved. Table 2.2 presents the estimation results for the fixed e↵ects models.6 The
dependent variable is total SO2 emissions at province i in year t (Emissionit). We include
time dummy variables for models shown in column (2) and (4). The results in general suggest
that the cumulative installation of FGD equipment and closure of small power plants are
negatively related to total emissions at a statistically significant level. For example, it is
suggested that an increase in the 10,000-ton capacity of FGD equipment leads to a reduction
6The Hausman test rejected the use of the random e↵ects model.
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of 6,700 7,800 ton of SO2. Also, the closure of coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 10
MW might lead to a reduction of roughly 120 tons of total SO2 emissions.
[Table 2.2]
The coe cient of fuel e ciency is negative and statistically significant at 10% in the
model in column (4). Since higher fuel e ciency means lower SO2 emissions per energy
production, this is theoretically reasonable.
The variables Contenti and TCZi are not included in above models because these are
time-invariant. Therefore, to estimate the impact of these variables, we use a hybrid method
developed by Mundlak (1978), namely the correlated random e↵ects model. Let assume
⇣i =  + ⌘Policiesi + ⇠i in the equation (1) and represent the estimation model as follows:
Emissionit = ↵ +  Policiesit +  Xi +  + ⌘Policiesi + ⇠i +  t + ✏it, (2.2)
By averaging across t, we obtain a cross-sectional equation:
Emissioni = (↵ +  ) +  Policiesi +  Xi + ⌘Policiesi + ⇠i +  t + ✏¯i, (2.3)
By subtracting (4) from (3), we have:
Emissionit   Emissioni = (Policiesit   Policiesi) + (✏it   ✏i)
) ¨Emissionit =  ¨Policiesit + ✏¨it,
(2.4)
By summation, we obtain:
Emissioni + ¨Emissionit =(↵ +  ) +   ¨Policiesit +  Policiesi
+ Xi + ⌘Policiesi + ⇠i +  t + ✏¯i + ✏¨it,
(2.5)
Finally, we obtain the following expression:
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Emissionit = (↵ +  ) +   ¨Policiesit + (  + ⌘)Policiesi +  Xi + ⇠i +  t + ✏it, (2.6)
If   + ⌘ =  , it is a random e↵ects model. If   + ⌘ 6=  , it is a fixed e↵ects model.
[Table 2.3]
The estimation result with the hybrid model are presented in Table 2.3. With regard
to the coe cient of FGDit and Closurei, we obtain a similar result to that in fixed e↵ects
model, that is they are negatively correlated with SO2 emissions in a statistically significant
way in most models.
The coe cient of Contenti is not statistically significant, perhaps because coal-fired
power plants do not use local coal. In China, coal production is concentrated in several
provinces.7 Moreover, imported coal has increasingly been used for thermal power plants in
recent years. Indeed, the use of imported coal increased 10-fold from 9.82 million tons in
2008 to 101 million tons in 2012 (Wang and Ducruet, 2014).
Total SO2 emissions are higher in the TCZ, although in a statistically insignificant man-
ner in every model. One reason might be that new coal-fired power plants have typically
been constructed outside the TCZ in recent years. Further, regional structure of Chinese
SO2 emissions might be gradually changing, since SO2 controls have been expanded to the
national level (SEPA and NDRC, 2007).
The results of our model thus suggest that the policy to install FGD equipment helped
reduce total SO2 emissions from 2006 to 2010. The estimated coe cient can be interpreted
as that a 10, 000-ton increase in the control capacity of FGD equipment is associated with
a 6,700 7,800 ton reductions in SO2 discharge. The actual reduction might have been
smaller than the installed capacity because some installed FGD equipment was not properly
operated. According to Xu (2009), less than 40% of the available capacity for the reduction
7Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia and Henan produced 62.1% of coal in 2012.
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of SO2 in coal-fired power plants was utilized in 2007. Our estimation results therefore
suggest that FGD equipment was not properly operated although the level might have been
better than that reported.
Our results also suggest that the closure of small coal-fired power plants might have
helped reduce SO2. The size of the estimated coe cient can be interpreted as that the
closure of coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 10 MW can reduce roughly 120 tons of
SO2 emissions when we use the coe cient from the model that include year dummy variables.
Based on this estimates, we can expect that the closure of 50 GW small coal-fired power
plants can reduce 0.6 million tons of SO2. This is considerably smaller than the assumption
of JES (2007) that the closure of 50 GW small coal-fired power plants can reduce 2.1 million
tons of SO2. When smaller power plants are closed, they are typically replaced with larger
and more e cient power generation units.8 Hence, the emissions from these new units with
larger capacity might o↵set some of the reductions of the closure policy.
2.5 Panel threshold estimators
Several scholars have pointed out that the the significant di↵erence in economic devel-
opment among Chinese regions should be considered when analyzing environmental policy
in China. For example, Song et al. (2013) use data envelopment analysis and find that
environmental e ciency is higher in a✏uent regions and lower in poor regions. Xu and Lin
(2016) also find that energy e ciency improvement has greater potential to mitigate PM2.5
emissions in the central and western regions than those in the eastern region because of the
lower technology levels.
Based upon these findings, this section investigate if the performance of pollution abate-
ment technology depends on the level of economic development in each region. Specifically,
we use GRP as a measure of economic development and assume that the e↵ectiveness of
8According to Li (2011), the guideline issued by the government in 2007 required that the capacity of
new coal-fired power units should be larger than 300MW and that in major grids should be larger than 600
MW.
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the installation of FGD equipment is significantly di↵erent between provinces above and
below a certain GRP threshold. Our hypothesis is that the coe cient of FGD indicates
the utilization of installed capacity, which decreases because of insu cient monitoring and
enforcement by the regulator. If there is a large disparity in enforcement activity between
a rich province and a poor province, the coe cient of FGD might be higher in the former
province than in the latter. In fact, o cial statistics on environmental monitoring in China
suggest that monitoring expenditures per monitoring station increases dramatically when
GRP per capita in a province is above 20,000 RMB (Figure 2.2).
[Figure 2.2]
To find the threshold between SO2 emissions and the installed ability of FGD equipment
in coal-fired power sector, we use a non-dynamic panels with individual-specific fixed e↵ects
(Hansen, 1999). This technique has been applied to investigate the relationship between
pollution and income (Aslanidis and Xepapadeas, 2006), the relationship between energy
consumption and economic growth (Huang et al., 2008), and the impact of exports on energy
intensity (Zheng et al., 2011).
We treat FGDit as the regime-dependent variable and GRPi,t 1 as the threshold variable.
In general, the threshold variable should be predetermined and stationary, therefore we use
GRPi,t 1 as the threshold variable:
Emissionit =↵ +  1FGDitI(✓1  GRPi,t 1 < ✓2)
+  2FGDitI(GRPi,t 1   ✓2) +  Xit + ⇣i +  t + ✏it,
(2.7)
In this model,  1 captures the e↵ectiveness of FGD for provinces below the threshold
and  2 captures that for provinces above the thresholds. We expect that  2 is higher than
 1, since a higher level of economic development would lead to the better enforcement of
environmental regulations. Figure 2.3 shows the scatter plot between GRPi,t 1 and FGDit.
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In our estimation, data for Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guizhou are excluded as outliers.
[Figure 2.3]
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.4. The coe cients of FGDit(✓1 
GRPi,t 1 < ✓2) and FGDit(GRPi,t 1   ✓2) are statistically significant in all models.9 In
all of the columns, we find that the threshold estimator is 20.63. The result means that the
e↵ectiveness of the installtion of FGD equipment di↵ers for provinces whose per capita GRP
is below or above 20,630 RMB. The estimated coe cients also suggest that a 10, 000-ton
increase in FGD capacity is associated with a 6, 000-ton reduction in total SO2 emissions
when GRP per capita is less than 20,630 RMB in a province. The e↵ectiveness of the same
FGD capacity is a 9, 200-ton reduction in total SO2 emissions when GRP per capita is more
than 20,630 RMB.
In 2005, only four provinces were above the threshold value and there were large dispar-
ities between those provinces whose prior year of GRP was the highest and lowest (Figure
2.4). The lowest and the highest GRP per capita was about 4,200 RMB and 43,800 RMB,
respectively. Indeed, because of the rapid economic development in China at that time,
11 provinces were above the threshold in 2010 and 20 were below. Further, between 2008
and 2009, average GRP per capita in China rose above the threshold. Higher income level
can lead to higher monitoring and enforcement, thereby increasing the e↵ectiveness of the
installation of FGD equipment.
[Table 2.4]
[Figure 2.4]
9The threshold e↵ect test shows that the threshold is not significant for the models of emissions from the
industrial sector. The LR test statistics also reject the existence of two thresholds for the models of total
emissions.
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2.6 Conclusion and policy implications
This chapter investigated the impact of policies for controlling SO2 emissions in the 11th
Five-Year Plan period, using a provincial-level panel dataset in China. First, the results
of our model suggest that the policy to install FGD equipment might have reduced total
SO2 emissions from 2006 to 2010. The estimated coe cient can be interpreted as that an
increase in the 10, 000-ton capacity of FGD equipment is associated with a 6,700 7,800 ton
reduction in SO2 discharge. Second, the closure of small coal-fired power plants might have
helped reduce SO2 emissions, too. The size of the estimated coe cient suggests that the
closure of coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 10 MW can reduce roughly 120 tons of
total SO2 discharge. These results suggest that the two policy measures examined herein
played a significant role in reducing SO2 emissions in China during that period, although the
size of the estimated coe cients shows that the e↵ects might have been weaker than those
predicted by ex-ante cost-benefit analysis.
I addition, we used a non-dynamic panel threshold e↵ects model and found significant
di↵erences in the e↵ectiveness of the installation of FGD equipment between provinces above
and below a GRP per capita threshold. As the Chinese economy develops, the gap between
provinces will converge, leading to better monitoring and enforcement by the environmental
departments in each provinces. As of 2010, FGD equipment has already been installed in
86% of coal-fired power plants in China. The next Five-Year Plan, should aim to emphasize
controlling pollution by monitoring and enforcing the use and operation of this installed
equipment.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit N Mean SD Min Max
Emissionit 10,000 t 186 77.01 47.45 0.200 200.3
FGDit 10,000 t 186 6.615 9.812 0.000 50.09
Closurei 10 MW 186 138.09 167.46 0.000 899.9
Levyi,t 1 10 million RMB 186 42.73 39.80 0.374 252.9
E ciency it % 180 0.205 0.043 0.071 0.380
GRPit 1,000 RMB 186 21.12 13.43 5.135 65.78
Contenti % 186 0.846 0.146 0.515 0.940
TCZi Dummy 186 0.452 0.499 0.000 1.000
Note: Levy and per capita GRP are adjusted to 2004 value by using the CPI.
23
Table 2.2: Estimation results: Fixed e↵ects model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGDit -0.783⇤⇤⇤ -0.674⇤⇤⇤ -0.729⇤⇤⇤ -0.663⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.092) (0.085) (0.093)
Closurei -0.005⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤ -0.004 -0.012⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Levyi,t 1 -0.002 -0.010
(0.025) (0.029)
E ciencyit -15.93⇤ -15.11⇤
(8.435) (7.965)
GRPit -0.131 -0.116
(0.147) (0.259)
Constant 85.67⇤⇤⇤ 84.97⇤⇤⇤ 91.24⇤⇤⇤ 90.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.623) (0.684) (2.664) (4.083)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes
N 180 180 180 180
R2w 0.820 0.840 0.828 0.844
Note: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. Models in columns (2) and (4) include
the year dummy variables for 2006 to 2010. Standard errors are
clustered by province and written in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Estimation results: Hybrid model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dFGDit -0.783⇤⇤⇤ -0.674⇤⇤⇤ -0.728⇤⇤⇤ -0.662⇤⇤⇤
(0.073) (0.093) (0.087) (0.095)
dClosurei -0.005⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤ -0.004 -0.012⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
dLevyi,t 1 -0.002 -0.011
(0.026) (0.030)
dE ciencyit -15.82⇤ -14.98⇤
(8.608) (8.132)
dGRPit -0.132 -0.117
(0.150) (0.265)
mFGDit 4.176⇤⇤⇤ 4.197⇤⇤⇤ 2.618⇤⇤⇤ 2.630⇤⇤⇤
(0.759) (0.766) (0.692) (0.703)
mClosurei 0.059 0.060 0.066⇤⇤ 0.067⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029)
mLevyi,t 1 0.432⇤⇤ 0.432⇤⇤
(0.203) (0.206)
mE ciency it -296.3⇤ -296.0
(179.4) (182.0)
mGRPit -0.288 -0.288
(0.366) (0.369)
Contenti -46.46 -46.46
(34.78) (35.28)
TCZi 6.348 6.354
(9.420) (9.550)
Constant 34.64⇤⇤⇤ 33.63⇤⇤⇤ 133.7⇤⇤⇤ 131.9⇤⇤⇤
(7.760) (8.258) (32.67) (33.56)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes
N 180 180 180 180
R2w 0.820 0.840 0.828 0.844
Note: All variables starting with a small d indicate the deviations
from the mean value and all variables starting with a small m indi-
cate the average among periods. ⇤ ⇤ ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Models
in columns (2) and (4) include the year dummy variables for 2006
to 2010. Standard errors are clustered by province and written in
parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Results of the threshold e↵ects (cleaned sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGDit(✓1  GRPit < ✓2) -0.686⇤⇤⇤ -0.609⇤⇤⇤ -0.654⇤⇤⇤ -0.593⇤⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.068) (0.082) (0.081)
FGDit(GRPit   ✓2) -1.020⇤⇤⇤ -0.907⇤⇤⇤ -0.970⇤⇤⇤ -0.921⇤⇤⇤
(0.123) (0.151) (0.181) (0.219)
Closurei -0.003⇤ -0.008⇤⇤ -0.002 -0.008⇤
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Levyi,t 1 -0.004 -0.011
(0.021) (0.024)
E ciency it -15.67 -14.49⇤
(9.267) (7.644)
GRPit -0.077 0.093
(0.185) (0.439)
Constant 89.51⇤⇤⇤ 89.10⇤⇤⇤ 93.85⇤⇤⇤ 91.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.500) (0.700) (2.954) (5.278)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes
N 156 156 156 156
R2w 0.860 0.872 0.863 0.875
Threshold number 1 1 1 1
Threshold value 20.63 20.63 20.63 20.63
Threshold e↵ect test 0.010 0.007 0.027 0.083
Note: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. Models in columns (2) and (4) include the year dummy
variables for 2006 to 2010. Robust standard errors are written in parentheses.
The threshold e↵ect test is displayed by a F statistic. We used 156 samples,
because the samples of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing was removed as
outliers. Double threshold models were not statistically significant.
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Chapter 3
Policies for Controlling NOx
Emissions and the denitration
technology choice
3.1 Introduction
A large proportion of air pollution in China stems from coal combustion: coal was the
source of 90% of all sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and 67% of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emis-
sions in 2005 (Liang et al., 2011). Although total SO2 emissions from the industrial sector
decreased from 22.37 million tons in 2006 to 18.35 million tons in 2013, total NOx emissions
increased from 11.36 million tons to 15.45 million tons during the same period (China State
Statistical Bureau, 2007, 2014). NOx emissions contribute to the formation of fine particles
(PM10/PM2.5) that inflict significant damage to the health of Chinese citizens (Chen et al.,
2015).
The regulation of NOx emissions in China has lagged behind that of SO2 emissions.
Between 2005 and 2010, the share of thermal power plants that installed desulfurization
equipment increased from 14% to 86%. As a result, total SO2 emissions decreased 14.29%
31
during the same period. In contrast, the Chinese government shifted its focus to the regula-
tion of NOx, starting with the 12th Five-year Plan initiated in 2011. This plan announced,
for the first time, a concrete target for reducing nitrogen oxide emissions: a 10% reduction
in NOx emissions from the 2010 levels by 2015 (State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, 2011a).
Several policies were implemented to control NOx emissions during the 12th Five-year
Plan (2011–2015). The 12th Five-year Plan on Environmental Protection insists that all
newly built power generation units and existing units whose capacities exceed 300 MW be
coupled with denitration equipment (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a).
The new NOx emission standards were released in July 2011 and took e↵ect in January 2012.
Furthermore, the government issued the 12th Five-year Plan for the Prevention and Control
of Air Pollution in Key Regions (Key Regions Plan) in October 2012 (Chinese Ministry
of Environmental Protection, 2012). It sets higher emissions reduction targets in specific
regions designated according to the type and level of air pollutants experienced there. The
government also o↵ered subsidies to thermal power plants that used denitration equipment.
As a result, the use of technology for controlling NOx began to proliferate. As of 2013, 1,238
pieces of denitration equipment had been installed on 7,515 boilers in 3,102 power plants in
China.1 By 2013, NOx emissions from the thermal power sector had decreased 1.2 million
tons (or by 11%) from the 2012 volume (Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection,
2014a).
Several engineering studies have investigated the role of technological options for control-
ling NOx emissions in the thermal power sector in China. Xiong et al. (2016) investigated
the emission inventory of coal-fired power plants in Shandong and projected future emis-
sions under three scenarios. Under the assumption that the penetration of selective catalytic
reduction (SCR) and selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) technology would increase
1The number is the total of utility power plants and non-utility power plants. The latter consists of power
plants managed by industrial sectors for their own energy consumption. There were 1,853 utility power plants
and 1,249 non-utility power plants in China in 2013. They have 4,825 and 2,690 boilers, respectively. Among
them, 1,076 utility boilers and 162 non-utility boilers had installed denitration equipment in 2013.
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from 10% and 2% in 2012 to 95% and 5% in 2030, respectively, they predict that NOx
emissions will decrease by 80.63% relative to the 2012 baseline. Zhao et al. (2008) eval-
uate the cost-e↵ectiveness of various coal-power technologies and estimate the di↵erences
in capital costs and overall cost of electricity. The net plant e ciency for the integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology is 45%, and NOx emissions are minimized by
using IGCC among all the technological options. However, the cost per unit of electricity
generated while using IGCC is 30% to 40% higher than the option using SNCR technology,
even when charges related to pollutant emissions are included. While these studies suggest
that the technology adoption will play a key role in reducing NOx emissions in China, details
on the actual adoption process and its driving force have not been analyzed.
On the other hand, economic studies of the technology choices for controlling NOx
have focused on cases in developed countries. For example, Popp (2010) investigates links
between knowledge stock and the adoption of NOx control technology in US coal-fired
power plants. His results suggest that an increased level of knowledge stock—measured
by patent count—increases the adoption rates of combustion modification techniques and
post-combustion treatments. Examining the impact of Swedish emission regulations, Sterner
and Turnheim (2009) considered the process of technological change in relation to NOx abate-
ment from large stationary sources. They regressed the plant emission intensities of NOx on
various explanatory variables, including specific technological options. Their results suggest
that the most significant and sizeable reduction was attained by using SCR, followed by that
attained using SNCR. Bonilla et al. (2015) studied how the use of various NOx abatement
technologies has di↵used under the Swedish system of refunded emission payments by ana-
lyzing the determinants of the time to adoption. Their results revealed an economy of scale:
the greater the capacity of the boiler, the more likely it is that post-combustion technologies
will be adopted. Their results also suggest that stringent standards increase the regulatory
costs of NOx emissions and motivate firms to invest in more than one NOx-reducing technol-
ogy. They attribute no explanatory power to the predicted decrease in net charge liabilities
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or to most of the other covariates across the subsamples in Sweden.
This chapter focuses on the choices of NOx control technology in the thermal power
sector in China, where air pollution is a major issue under conditions of rapid economic
growth. We analyze how technological choices have been influenced by government policies,
the stringency of national standards, and subsidies for using specific technologies. We focus
on the available post-combustion technologies, as the removal e ciency of NOx through
post-combustion technology is higher than that through the pre-combustion or combustion
process. We find that SNCR adoption increased after 2010 and identify a clear distinction
in regional distribution between the pre- and post- 2010 periods concerning the adoption
of SCR technology. We also investigate how subsidies for operating denitration equipment
a↵ected SCR adoption and find that subsidies somewhat discouraged it, perhaps because
SCR is more expensive than the other technological options.
In Section 3.2, we provide background information and develop our hypothesis. We also
introduce the denitration technology, national standards, and various policies relevant to the
NOx emitted by thermal power sector in China. Section 3.3 explains the chapter’s empirical
strategy and data. Section 3.4 presents the chapter’s empirical results, and Section 3.5
concludes the paper.
3.2 Background, and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Technological Options for Post-combustion Control
The abatement of NOx emissions occurs by way of three di↵erent processes: pre-
combustion control, combustion modification, and post-combustion capture (Skalska et al.,
2010; Cheng and Bi, 2014). Pre-combustion control involves fuel purification, used to reduce
the nitrogen content of the fuel. Combustion modification refers to technology improvements
in the boiler design, which can reduce NOx formation during the combustion processes. Post-
combustion technologies are end-of-pipe solutions that reduce NOx in the flue gases following
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the combustion stage. Post-combustion technologies can remove up to 90% of NOx (Guo
et al., 2012), while that of pre-combustion control and combustion modification control can
reduce NOx by only less than 50% (Radojevic, 1998). Therefore, the adoption of post-
combustion technology is important for making any significant reductions in NOx emissions.
The SCR and SNCR technology are representative post-combustion processes. SCR
technology is usually applied to thermal power plants with capacities greater than 200 MW
and that work at a temperature in the range of 300 to 400  C (Cofala and Syri, 1998). While
the denitration e ciency of SCR is high (i.e., up to 80 90%), one problem is that catalyst
pollutes the environment (Zhou et al., 2012). The ammonia used in the catalytic process
can corrode the equipment, produce ash pollution, and damage the environment. SNCR is
another technology used to control NOx emissions from coal-fired power plants. Since it does
not require any catalyst, the denitration process produces no pollution. It incurs a lower
investment cost and can be applied to any size of unit. On the other hand, it requires a
high working temperature (i.e., 870 1100  C), and its rate of denitration e ciency is usually
lower than 40% (Liang et al., 2011).
Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of these two technologies. SCR requires catalyst,
while SNCR does not, and there is a pressure loss with SCR but not with SNCR. The removal
e ciency of SCR is as high as 80%, while that of SNCR is 40% at most. The construction
cost of SCR is higher than that of SNCR. SCR produces ammonium hydrogen sulfate, while
SNCR does not (Zhou et al., 2012). In addition to the SCR and SNCR technologies, a hybrid
of these two technologies, SNCR SCR, is used in Chinese thermal power plants (Liang et
al., 2011). It is more environmentally friendly and cost-e↵ective than SCR and is more
denitration-e cient than SNCR. SCR and SNCR technologies were initially installed in the
early 2000s, while the first SNCR SCR technology was installed in 2006 (Chinese Ministry
of Environmental Protection, 2014b). As we will see in a later section, a large proportion of
these technologies were installed after 2010.
[Table 3.1]
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3.2.2 National Emission Standards
Table 3.2 summarizes the national standards for NOx control in China. National emis-
sions standards for NOx from thermal power plants were introduced and updated in 1997,
2003, and 2012. These are included in direct regulations of various air pollutants from the
power generation sector, named GB13223-1996, GB13223-2003, and GB13223-2011. These
GBs are implemented on the basis of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.
[Table 3.2]
GB13223-1996 included the first national standard for controlling NOx emissions from
the thermal power sector. It requires that e✏uent concentrations be less than 650 mg/m3.
The regulation applies only to boilers with a maximum continuous rating greater than 1,000
t/h and that began operating after January 1997. GB13223-1996 was updated to GB13223-
2003 in 2003; the emissions standard in this GB varied according to the year in which the
plant was built. The first category contains plants that started operations before the end of
1996; the second category includes plants that started operations between January 1997 and
December 2003; and the third category includes plants that started operations after January
2004. For plants in the first category, the most stringent standard was 1,100 mg/m3. For
the second and third categories, the values were 650 mg/m3 and 450 mg/m3, respectively.
More stringent standards were applied to newer plants. Subsequently, GB13223-2011 was
introduced in 2012. The most stringent standard is 450 mg/m3 and applies to plants that
were in operation until 2012; it is 100 mg/m3 for those that started operations after 2012.
It is reasonable to expect that more stringent standards would encourage firms to employ
denitration technology that features higher removal e ciency. On the other hand, firms
might not control their emissions, even under tighter standards, due to insu cient monitoring
and enforcement. In such a case, regulation via stringent standards might not be e↵ective
in inducing firms to invest in better emissions control equipment.
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3.2.3 Policy Instruments under Five-year Plans
The Chinese government mentioned NOx control as a policy agenda for the first time
in the 11th Five-year Plan (2006–2010). The government announced that it would control
the growth trend of NOx emissions and reduce the power sector’s NOx emissions intensity
by 2010. The government also announced that it would control the total NOx discharge by
2020. However, the plan did not specify any concrete target during that period (Chinese
Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2012).
The subsequent 12th Five-year Plan (2011–2015) introduced a concrete target for NOx
emissions for the first time in the history of Chinese environmental policy. Based on the
12th Five-year Plan on Environmental Protection in December 2011, it announced a 10%
reduction in NOx emissions by 2015 from 2010 levels (State Council of the People’s Republic
of China, 2011a). The emissions target for each province in China was also announced
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011b). The targets exceed 15% in the
eastern regions such as the Yangtze River Delta area, the Beijing–Tianjing–Tangshan area,
and the Pearl River Delta area (see Table 3.3), and are approximately 10% in the inland
areas. Areas such as Hainan and Qinghai were allowed to increase their emissions, suggesting
that di↵erences in economic development levels were considered when these targets were set
(Xing, 2012).
In October 2012, the 12th Five-year Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution
in Key Regions (Key Regions Plan) was issued to promote the enforcement of air pollution
control in specific regions. The 2015 reduction target for NOx emissions in key regions was
13%, and that for the NOx concentration was 7%, both from 2010 levels. Furthermore, the
Key Regions Plan defines Key Control Areas with regards to di↵erent types of air pollution,
where even stricter pollution control measures were implemented. Concerning NOx control,
44 cities in the central region of Liaoning, around of Wuhan, Changsha–Zhuzhou–Xiangtan,
Chengdu–Chongqing, and the urban area of Western Taiwan Straits were designated as Key
Control Areas (Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2012). We can expect that
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the reduction target of each province and the designation of the Key Control Areas impacted
firms’ choices of NOx control technology during this period.
[Table 3.3]
Regarding the means of controlling NOx emissions, the 12th Five-year Plan insists that
all newly built power generation units and large existing units (  300 MW) be equipped
with flue gas denitrification equipment (Zhao et al., 2013). The Key Regions Plan an-
nounced that thermal power generating units larger than 200 MW that had been operating
for fewer than 20 years should have denitration equipment installed, and it required that the
removal e ciency of that equipment be greater than 85%. Moreover, the government would
strengthen its monitoring of installed equipment to ensure its stable operation. To o↵er an
incentive for operating control equipment, in November 2011, the Chinese National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission introduced a subsidy via higher on-grid electricity prices
for coal-fired power plants that were using NOx emissions control equipment. The policy
was first implemented in 14 pilot provinces selected from China’s 31. The subsidy level was
0.008 RMB/kWh in addition to the baseline electricity price. In the first half of 2012, NOx
emissions declined by 0.24% from the previous year. Denitration e ciency was 40.3%, a
16.1% increase over the previous year. In January 2013, the application for a subsidy was
extended nationwide, although the subsidy level remained unchanged from the 2011 level
(Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, 2013). These policy instruments
might influence the adoption of particular technologies, as plants might choose cheaper and
less-e↵ective technologies if monitoring and enforcement instruments are not strong.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.3.1 Empirical Model
We focus on the choices of technologies used to control NOx within China’s thermal power
sector. We assume that these choices are a↵ected by the policies, subsidies, and economic
characteristics of each region. We also assume that there are three options (j = 1, 2, 3) for
control technology (i.e., SCR = 1, SNCR = 2, SNCR SCR = 3). The expected profit that
the ith boiler (i =1,...,n) derives from the jth option can be expressed as Vij. The expected
profit function is written as:
Vij =  j1Pi +  j2Si +  j3Oi +  j4Ei + ✏ij = Zij + ✏ij, (3.1)
where P represents the policies applied when the boiler is transformed, S represents the
standards applied to the emissions from the thermal power plant, O denotes boiler-specific
characteristics, and E represents regional economic characteristics. We use a multinomial
logit model to analyze plants’ choices among the three technologies.
A plant will choose the technological optionm if and only if it brings the highest economic
return among all the available choices. In other words, the probability that plant i will choose
alternative m is
Pr(Yi = m) = Pr(Vim > Vij) for all j = 1, 2, 3, j 6= m
=) Pr(Zim + ✏im) > Pr(Zij + ✏ij)
=) Pr(Zim   Zij) > Pr(✏ij   ✏im) for all j = 1, 2, 3, j 6= m.
(3.2)
Based on McFadden (1973), the error terms ✏ij are assumed to be independently and iden-
tically distributed with Weibull distribution F (✏ij) = exp[exp( ✏ij)]; then,
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Pr(Yi = m) =
exp(Zim)
exp(Zi1) + exp(Zi2) + exp(Zi3)
, (3.3)
Pr(Yi = k) =
exp(Zik)
exp(Zi1) + exp(Zi2) + exp(Zi3)
. (3.4)
From equations (3) and (4), the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of outcome j = m
to that of outcome j = k is
log
✓
Pr(Yi = m)
Pr(Yi = k)
◆
= ( m1   k1)Pi+ ( m2   k2)Si+ ( m3   k3)Oi+ ( m4   k4)Ei, (3.5)
Pi includes policies for controlling NOx emissions. In our analysis, there are five explana-
tory variables for policies. 12th FYP is a dummy variable denoting whether a boiler was
transformed during the 12th Five-year Plan. NOx Control Area is a dummy variable denot-
ing whether a boiler was built in the NOx control area designated under the Key Regions
Plan.2 This dummy variable takes the value of one if a boiler was operating in a NOx con-
trol area and transformed after 2012. Subsidy 2011 and Subsidy 2013 are dummy variables
for subsidy policies for boilers operating denitration equipment implemented in November
2011 in 14 specific provinces and January 2013 nationwide, respectively. Subsidy 2011 takes
the value of one if the boiler operates in 14 pilot provinces and was transformed in 2011
or 2012. Subsidy 2013 takes value of one if the boiler was transformed in 2013. Provincial
Target represents the reduction target for NOx until 2015 in each province; it is denoted by
a percentage reduction from 2010 emissions in each province. Since the provincial target is
announced in 2011, the variable takes zero for all boilers that installed the control equipment
before that year.
Si is the stringency of emissions standards for NOx emitted by the thermal power sector.
2These are 44 cities and areas that belong to the central region of Liaoning, around Wuhan, and in each
of Changsha–Zhuzhou–Xiangtan, Chengdu–Chongqing, and the urban area of Western Taiwan Straits.
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This is represented by the Emission Standard variable, which uses the values applied to
each boiler under GB13223-1996, GB13223-2003, and GB13223-2011. For example, we set
the value of Emission Standard equal to 1,100 if a boiler started operations before 1996
and transformed before 2010 because the GB applied to this boiler when it installed control
equipment was GB13223-2003, and, under this GB, the emissions standard applied to this
boiler was 1,100 mg/m3. Likewise, we set the emissions standard level equal to 650 if
operations started between 1997 and 2003 and the transformation took place earlier than
2010. Similarly, the value equals 450 if the boiler started operations earlier than 2003 and
transformed after 2011 or if its first operation year was between 2004 and 2011. We set the
value equal to 100 if the first year of operation was after 2012.
Oi summarizes the individual characteristics of boilers. Capacity is a variable reflecting
boiler capacity. Installation Age measures the years that passed between when the boiler
started operations and when NOx control equipment was installed. Selfbuilt is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the plant installed control equipment that it had
manufactured; if the plant installed control equipment manufactured by other companies,
the value is zero.
Ei summarizes the economic characteristics of each province. We use four variables: gross
regional products (GRP), value-added in the manufacturing sector, utilization of the thermal
power sector, and share of thermal power to total capacity. GRP represents the real GRP
in each province, and Industrial Value-added is the real value added of the manufacturing
sector in each province. Utilization represents the utilization of thermal power capacity in
each province; we calculate this variable by dividing the generated electricity by the capacity
of thermal power plants in each province. Share of Thermal Power measures the capacity
share of the thermal power sector; it is calculated by dividing the capacity of thermal power
generation by the total capacity of the electricity sector in each province.
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3.3.2 Data
We use boiler-level data from the Denitration Equipment List of National Coal-Fired
Boilers, which is accessible from the website of the data center of the Chinese Ministry
of Environmental Protection (http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn). The list contains information
on 1,135 utility and non-utility boilers that have installed denitration equipment and are
operating in China as of 2013. Since the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection
(2014a) reports that there are 1,238 pieces of denitration equipment in thermal power plants
in China as of 2013, it captures 92% of equipment operating at that moment. We collect
information on the name of the plant, the generation capacity, the year in which it started
operations, the year in which it adopted denitration equipment, the construction company
that installed the equipment, the type of denitration technology chosen, and the province in
which each boiler is operating. Unfortunately, the database does not contain information on
the boilers without denitration equipment, restricting our analysis to the technology choices
of those that installed them. Figure 3.1 presents the cumulative number of boilers with
denitration equipment in our dataset and compares it with the total number of boilers with
capacity larger than 6MW from 2001 to 2013. It is clear that our dataset captures only a
fraction of boilers operating in China.3
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.4. On average, the boilers in our sample had
a capacity of 381 MW and were 6.78 years old when denitration equipment was installed.
Figure 3.2 shows the number of boilers that started operation in each year. In the sample,
81.59% of the boilers were built after 2000. There was a significant increase in the number
of boilers after 2003, as the Chinese economy started to grow rapidly after China joined the
World Trade Organization in 2000. Many boilers in our dataset had denitration equipment
installed after 2007 (see Figure 3.3). Although the earliest installation took place in 2001,
only nine boilers featured denitration equipment until 2006. The number of boilers with the
3In 3.4.4, we analyze the decision to install denitration equipment by looking at the installation situation
of 1,083 boilers operating in 2012.
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NOx control equipment exceeded 100 after 2011; among these, 84% of the boilers installed
control equipment during the 12th Five-year Plan period.
[Table 3.4]
[Figure 3.1]
[Figure 3.2]
[Figure 3.3]
Among the 1,135 boilers in our dataset, 894 (79%) installed SCR technology, 209 (18%)
installed SNCR technology, and 32 (3%) installed SNCR SCR technology. Various factors
potentially a↵ect these choices. Figure 3.4 is a box chart indicating the distribution of the
boiler size for the three technology choices. It suggests that SCR technologies are chosen by
larger boilers while SNCR are installed on smaller units. The age of the boiler also matters
for technology choice. Figure 3.5 shows that SNCR SCR is installed on old boilers, while
SCR is installed on new units.
Of the total, 275 boilers (24%) installed denitration equipment in the year they began
operations.4 It is very likely that these boilers are equipped with NOx control technology
when they are constructed. Interestingly, many boilers that installed equipment in the first
year of their operation choose SCR and SNCR technology, but none installed SNCR SCR.
This can be also confirmed by Figure 3.6, which shows the relationship between the year the
boilers began operating and the year they installed their NO x control equipment. The upper
parts of these figures include frontier lines indicating boilers that installed equipment in the
year they began operating. While there are dots on the frontier lines in the SCR and SNCR
panel, there are no dots on the line in the SNCR SCR panel. The dots in the SNCR panel
are concentrated on the right, indicating that most of the boilers installed SNCR technology
after 2010.
4In Appendix A, we investigate the characteristics of these boilers that installed the denitration equip-
ment in the first year of their operation.
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[Figure 3.4]
[Figure 3.5]
[Figure 3.6]
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Baseline analysis
We use a multinomial logit model to investigate the factors a↵ecting plants’ choices among
the three denitration technologies. The results are shown in Table 3.5. Since we take SNCR
technology as the base technology, the coe cients in the models show the e↵ect of various
factors on the choice of SCR or SNCR–SCR technology over SNCR technology. As noted
earlier, SNCR has the lowest investment cost but also the lowest denitration e ciency. To
avoid correlation with the dummy variable for the 12th Five-year Plan period (12th FYP),
we exclude variables concerning the subsidy policy (i.e., Subsidy 2011 and Subsidy 2013 ) in
these estimations.
[Table 3.5]
Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows how various policies influence each plant’s choices of
technology. We also estimate models with control variables (GRP and Industrial Value-
added); the results are in columns (2) and (3). The coe cient of 12th FYP has a negative
sign and is statistically significant for the choice of SCR over SNCR. On the other hand, the
coe cient of NOx Control Area variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant for
SCR technology (columns (1)–(3)). While SNCR technology (the cheapest technology) was
preferred during the 12th Five-year Plan period over SCR technology (the most expensive
technology), this is not the case for the plants located in the NOx control areas. In columns
(4) to (6) of Table 3.5, we use Targeted Plant in 12th FYP, rather than 12th FYP. The
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variable is a dummy denoting plants targeted in the 12th Five-year Plan; taking the value of
one when a boilers is larger than 300 MW and transformed during the 12th Five-year Plan,
and zero otherwise. The coe cient of this variable is statistically insignificant for the choice
of SCR over SNCR, suggesting that there is no di↵erence among these technologies in terms
of firm preference.
Regarding boiler characteristics, Capacity is both positive and statistically significant, in
line with our expectation that plants with larger boilers tend to choose SCR or SNCR–SCR
over SNCR technology. Installation Age is positive and statistically significant for SCR tech-
nology, suggesting that the plants with older boilers tend to choose SCR technology. The
dummy variable for the self-built denitration equipment (Selfbuilt) is negative and statisti-
cally significant for the choice of SNCR–SCR. Emission Standard is negative and statistically
significant for the choice of SCR over SNCR technology; since a lower-value for this variable
means stricter regulation, it is reasonable to derive a negative coe cient for the choice of a
more e cient technology option.
Therefore, we find a negative and statistically significant results for the dummy variable
of the 12th Five-year Plan concerning the more expensive technological choices. On the other
hand, the e↵ect is statistically insignificant when we use the Targeted Plant in 12th FYP ; this
di↵erence suggests that plants with boilers larger than 300 MW are indi↵erent about which
technologies to choose to control NOx. Furthermore, two policies might have promoted the
choice of SCR technologies during the 12th Five-year Plan period. The positive coe cient
of the NOx Control Area dummy can be interpreted to mean that plants in NOx control
areas tend to choose more expensive technology to control NOx and thus fulfill the stringent
requirements under the policy. The statistically significant coe cient of Emission Standard
also suggests that SCR technology was chosen under more stringent emission regulations.
As an additional analysis, we create the dummy variable Targeted Plant in Key Regions
to denote the installation of denitration equipment in thermal power generating units that
are larger than 200 MW, had operated for fewer than 20 years by 2013, and operated in
45
key regions. The results are shown in Table 3.6. The coe cient of the variable is negative
but statistically insignificant for both SCR and SNCR–SCR technologies, suggesting that
the boilers targeted in the Key Regions Plan did not strictly comply with the requirement
immediately.
[Table 3.6]
Regarding boiler capacity, plants with larger-sized boilers might obey the policy by choos-
ing a higher-e ciency technology because doing so is economically reasonable for them. This
is also suggested by the positive and significant coe cient of the Capacity variable for choos-
ing SCR and SNCR–SCR than SNCR technology. To investigate whether the e↵ect of the
targeted policy might di↵er according to boiler size, we use di↵erent boiler sizes (i.e., 300–
800 MW instead of 200 MW) to create the Targeted Plant in Key Regions variable. The
results are presented in Table 3.7. Targeted Plant in Key Regions is positive and statistically
significant when the boiler is larger than 600 MW, suggesting that, under this policy, boilers
operating for fewer than 20 years will choose SCR technology when the boiler is larger than
600 MW. Thus, the requirement stipulated in the Key Regions Plan might a↵ect the choice
of plants with larger boilers but not that of plants with smaller ones.
[Table 3.7]
3.4.2 Comparisons before and after 2010
This subsection examines changes in plants’ choices of technology before and after the
12th Five-year Plan. We conduct separate estimations for subsamples based on the timing
of their installation of control equipment in boilers (i.e., before or after 2010). We also
investigate di↵erences among the eastern, central, and western regions of China by including
dummy variables (East and West) and using the central region as a base category. Income
is the highest in the eastern region, and the western region lags behind in terms of economic
development. Some studies have pointed out that the regional di↵erences among Chinese
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provinces a↵ect their energy consumption and environmental policies (Song et al., 2013; Xu
and Lin, 2016).
[Table 3.8]
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.8. East and West are positive and
statistically significant until 2010; during the 12th Five-year Plan period, however, they
were not significant for the choice of SCR technology. These results suggest that regional
di↵erences do not play a significant role in the plants’ choice of SCR technology after 2010.
Capacity is also positive and statistically significant after 2010 but is statistically in-
significant for choices of SNCR–SCR until 2010. Installation Age is positive and statistically
significant after 2010 for SCR but negative and statistically significant for the period until
2010 for the choice of SNCR SCR. Plants with newer boilers prefer SNCR SCR technology
before 2010, and those with older boilers prefer SCR technology after 2010.
The stringency of emission standards (Emission Standard) is statistically insignificant
for SCR and is positive and statistically significant for SNCR–SCR technology until 2010;
after 2010, however, it is negative and statistically significant for both SCR and SNCR–
SCR technologies. Since the lower value of Emission Standard points to a stricter emission
regulation, the negative sign means that the technology is chosen when the regulation is
tighter. The result suggests that plants under a stricter regulation prefer SCR and SNCR–
SCR technologies over SNCR technology after 2010. Until 2010, however, the e↵ects of
emissions standards had no impact on the choice of technology.
The results discussed above can be summarized as follows. First, until 2010, SCR tech-
nology was chosen more readily by plants in the eastern and western regions than by plants
in the central region. This can be explained by the regional di↵erences in capital investment
in the early 2000s. Since the western region was less developed than the other two regions,
huge investments were made in this region under the Western Development Program. Be-
cause of this, plants in the western region were more able to purchase expensive pollution
47
control equipment than those in the central region were. After 2010, as the economy in the
central region caught up, these regional di↵erences might have become insignificant. Sec-
ond, the results suggest that plants under stricter emission standards will choose SCR and
SNCR–SCR technologies during the 12th Five-year Plan period. A more stringent standard
might play a role in plants’ preference for e cient technology during this period.
3.4.3 Subsidy policy
This subsection discusses the e↵ect of subsidy policies during the period of the 12th
Five-year Plan. The subsidy is o↵ered to plants whose boilers are fitted with denitration
equipment and takes the form of a premium on the electricity prices. We use the dummy
variables Subsidy 2011 and Subsidy 2013 to express two kinds of subsidies. Subsidy 2011
refers to the 14 provinces taking part in this subsidy’s pilot program, initiated in November
2011. Subsidy 2013 takes the value of one if the installation of control equipment took place
after January 2013, when the subsidy was extended nationwide.
[Table 3.9]
The results in Table 3.9 show that Subsidy 2011 is negative and statistically significant
for choosing SCR and SNCR–SCR technology over SNCR technology. This suggests that
the subsidy policy o↵ered in the 14 pilot provinces might have promoted investment in
cheaper technology. On the other hand, the coe cient for Subsidy 2013 is statistically
insignificant in most of the estimations. When the subsidy was extended nationwide, it did
not a↵ect the plants’ choice of technology. After January 2012, stringent emission standards
were implemented, which might have promoted the choice of technologies that were highly
e cient at removing emissions; this e↵ect might have been strong enough to o↵set the impact
of the subsidy (i.e., to choose a cheaper technology).
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3.4.4 Analysis of the installation status in 2012
All boilers in our dataset had installed denitration equipment by 2013. In this subsection,
we investigate the decision to install pollution control equipment by looking at the instal-
lation status as of 2012. In our dataset, the 538 boilers (50% of 1,083 boilers operating in
2012) installed denitration equipment in 2013 did not have denitration equipment in 2012.
Therefore, we can use a logit model to investigate the factors a↵ecting the installtion deci-
sion as of 2012 by regarding these 538 boilers as being without denitration equipment.5 We
define Installation2012 as a dummy variable reflecting the installation status of denitration
equipment as of 2012. It takes the value of one if the boiler had denitration equipment
installed by 2012 and zero otherwise. We estimate the following model:6
logit(Pr(Installation2012i)) =  1Pi +  2Oi +  3Ei, (3.6)
[Table 3.10]
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.10. The number of observation is reduced
to 1,083, since 52 boilers that started their operation in 2013 are excluded in this analysis.
Provincial Target 2012 is positive and statistically significant in all models, while NOx Con-
trol Area is mostly not statistically significant. These results suggest that provincial (rather
than national) policy is more e↵ective in promoting control equipment. Capacity and First
Operation Year is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that larger sized boilers
and newer boilers tend to introduce denitration technologies. Utilization and Share of Ther-
mal Power are not statistically significant. In other words, the results can be interpreted to
5There remains the issue of sample selection, since all the 1,083 boilers in this analysis had installed
control equipment by the end of 2013. As of 2013, there were 7,515 boilers in China, including non-utility
power plants (Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2014a).
6Some variables used in the technology choice model are not included or are modified in the logit model
because of di↵erence in assumptions. We cannot include Targeted Plant in 12th FYP or 12th FYP, since
these variables perfectly predicts the installation status. We include Provincial Target 2012 to represents
the reduction target for NOx until 2015 in each province as of 2012. Moreover, as we assumed that the
538 boilers are without equipment, the variable Selfbuilt and Emission Standard are not used. We used the
variable First Operation Year instead of Installation age. First Operation Year represents the year that the
boiler started their operation.
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mean that boilers that are smaller, older, and are in provinces with lower emissions reduction
targets tend not to have the NOx control equipment installed.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the choices of denitration technology in the Chinese thermal
power sector. Considering the choices made by 1,135 boilers operating in China in 2013, we
derived the following results. First, the 12th Five-year Plan might encourage plants to choose
SNCR technology, the cheapest of the three denitration technological options. We consider
that, under the 12th Five-year Plan, strict policy enforcement was implemented, and plants
chose the technology that would satisfy the emission target at the cheapest cost. The results
suggest that the plants have some flexibility in choosing a preferred technology even though
command-and-control policies constitute major instruments of Chinese environmental policy.
As Liu et al. (2013) point out, the a↵ordability of energy costs is an important driver of
their energy management strategies for Chinese companies.
Second, prior to the 12th Five-year Plan period, regional di↵erences had significant e↵ects
on technology choices; these later disappeared, perhaps due to the economic development
that occurred across all regions of China. On the other hand, the e↵ect of emission standards
was statistically significant only during the 12th Five-year Plan period. The implementation
of emission standards after 2011 is thought to be ever more stringent.
Finally, the subsidy of electricity prices for plants with denitration equipment might
have a↵ected their technology choice. Unfortunately, since the subsidy does not depend on
the technology option chosen, plants might choose the cheapest technology to lower their
investment costs. As many studies have pointed out, an incautious subsidy policy may lead
to overcapacity, overinvestment, and fierce competition in the power sector (Shen and Luo,
2015; Zhang et al., 2016).
Chinese policy for controlling SO2 has advanced in the 11th Five-year Plan period
50
(Schreifels et al., 2012; Ma and Takeuchi, 2016). Control of NOx began in earnest dur-
ing the 12th Five-year Plan period. Our results suggest that incentives to save investment
costs and receive subsidies might influence the choice of technology: therefore, the sophis-
tication of the design of economic instruments could play a role in China’s development of
e↵ective and e cient environmental policy.
While this chapter focused on the technology choice of boilers that installed NOx control
equipment, it is important to note that it does not capture the decision making for the
large portion of boilers that have not installed the equipment. We attempted to consider
this decision in subsection 4.4, but it is not free from the sample selection bias, and the
result should be interpreted with caution. Further chapter is necessary to understand the
full picture of NOx control strategy in the Chinese thermal power sector.
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Appendix A
To examine the di↵erence between boilers with equipment installed from the beginning
and boilers with it installed after years of operation, we use the following logit model:
logit(Pr(AgeZeroi)) =  1Pi +  2Si +  3Oi +  4Ei, (3.7)
where AgeZero is a dummy variable that takes value of one when the boiler has NOx control
equipment installed at the start of operations and zero otherwise. The model also includes
dummy variables SCR and SNCR SCR to indicate the use of these technologies. By looking
at the coe cient of these variables, we can investigate the characteristics of boilers with
control equipment installed in the first year.
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[Table 3.11]
The estimation results are summarized in Table 3.11. Capacity and First Operation
Year are positive and statistically significant in all models, suggesting that larger and recent
boilers tend to have denitration equipment installed in the first year. SCR is positive and
statistically significant in all models, meaning that SCR technology tends to be installed
in the first year, relative to SNCR technology. On the other hand, SNCR SCR is not
statistically significant. 12th FYP, NOx Control Area and Provincial Target are all negative
and statistically significant. These results might be interpreted to mean that these policies
for NOx control promote the installation of control equipment on boilers that did not have
equipment in their first year of operation.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of SCR and SNCR technology
SCR SNCR
Catalyst Yes (30% of investment) No
Pressure loss Yes No
Size Large Small
Reduction process Outside of the boiler Inside of the boiler
E ciency 80% 25  40%
Cost of construction High Low
Side e↵ect Produce NH4HSO4 –
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Table 3.2: Emission standards for NOx in China
Classification based on first year of operation
I II III
GB13223-1996 N.S. N.S. 650mg/m3
(Before Aug.1, 1992) (Aug.1, 1992–Dec.31, 1996) (After Jan.1, 1997)
GB13223-2003 1100mg/m3 650mg/m3 450mg/m3
(Before Dec.31, 1996) (Jan.1, 1997–Dec.31, 2003) (After Jan.1, 2004 )
GB13223-2011 450mg/m3 100mg/m3
(Before Dec.31, 2011) (After Jan.1, 2012)
Note: The values indicate the most stringent standards applied for boilers that started operations in each
period (as shown in the bracket). N.S.: not specified. GB 13223-1996 standards are applied only to cases
of 1000t/h or more.
58
Table 3.3: NOx target in 12th Five-year Plan for each province
Province Emissions in 2010
Target
Target in 2015 Change from 2010 (%)
Beijing 19.8 17.4 -12.3
Tianjin 34 28.8 -15.2
Hebei 171.3 147.5 -13.9
Shanxi 124.1 106.9 -13.9
Inner Mongolia 131.4 123.8 -5.8
Liaoning 102 88 -13.7
Jilin 58.2 54.2 -6.9
Heilongjiang 75.3 73 -3.1
Shanghai 44.3 36.5 -17.5
Jiangsu 147.2 121.4 -17.5
Zhejiang 85.3 69.9 -18
Anhui 90.9 82 -9.8
Fujian 44.8 40.9 -8.6
Jiangxi 58.2 54.2 -6.9
Shandong 174 146 -16.1
Henan 159 135.6 -14.7
Hubei 63.1 58.6 -7.2
Hunan 60.4 55 -9
Guangdong 132.3 109.9 -16.9
Guangxi 45.1 41.1 -8.8
Hainan 8 9.8 22.3
Chongqing 38.2 35.6 -6.9
Sichuan 62 57.7 -6.9
Guizhou 49.3 44.5 -9.8
Yunnan 52 49 -5.8
Xizang 3.8 3.8 0
Shannxi 76.6 69 -9.9
Gansu 42 40.7 -3.1
Qinghai 11.6 13.4 15.3
Ningxia 41.8 39.8 -4.9
Xinjiang 67.6 67.6 0
Total 2,273.6 2,021.6 -11.1
Source: Xing (2012).
Note: The unit is in 10, 000t; the total emissions target is 20, 462kt. The di↵erence in the
total emissions target in this table is used by the Chinese government for reduction of NOx
emissions trading.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
12th FYP (dummy) 1,135 0.843 0.364 0 1
Targeted Plant in 12th FYP (dummy) 1,135 0.082 0.275 0 1
NOx Control Area (dummy) 1,135 0.033 0.178 0 1
Subsidy 2011a(dummy) 1,135 0.186 0.389 0 1
Subsidy 2013 (dummy) 1,135 0.520 0.500 0 1
Selfbuilt (dummy) 1,135 0.025 0.155 0 1
Provincial Target (%) 1,135 0.108 0.067 -0.223 0.180
Capacity (GW) 1,135 0.381 0.256 0.003 1.03
Installation Ageb(year) 1,135 6.782 7.247 0 52
Emission Standard (1, 000 mg/m3) 1,135 0.434 0.158 0.1 1.1
Utilization (1, 000 h) 1,135 4.956 1.821 3.295 46.44
Share of Thermal Power (%) 1,135 0.787 0.159 0.137 0.999
GRP (trillion RMB) 1,135 22.22 13.64 1.299 47.98
Industrial Value-added (trillion RMB) 1,135 11.41 7.807 0.463 27.46
Note: Data regarding the Key Control Area and provincial targets were obtained from the
Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection (2012) and Xing (2012). GRP and the value-
added of the manufacturing sector were obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook (China
State Statistical Bureau, 2002-2014). Province-level capacity and generation data were obtained
from the CEIC database (CEIC, 2015).
a The 14 pilot provinces that implemented trial subsidies on electricity price starting in November
2011 were: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian,
Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Gansu, and Ningxia. The dummy variable Subsidy 2011 takes
the value of one if the control equipment was installed after November 2011 and it is located in
one of these 14 provinces.
b Installation Age refers to the number of years that passed between the first operation of the
boiler and the installation of denitration equipment.
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Table 3.5: Targeted plant in key regions
(1) (2) (3)
SCR
Targeted Plant in Key Regions -0.297 -0.353 -0.343
(0.516) (0.524) (0.523)
NOx Control Area 1.746⇤ 1.797⇤ 1.754
(1.054) (1.082) (1.080)
Provincial Target -0.054⇤⇤ -0.062⇤⇤⇤ -0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Capacity 16.37⇤⇤⇤ 17.08⇤⇤⇤ 17.00⇤⇤⇤
(1.354) (1.559) (1.546)
Installation Age 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Selfbuilt -0.429 -0.438 -0.415
(0.409) (0.410) (0.413)
Emission Standard -1.543 -1.768⇤ -1.767⇤
(1.047) (0.977) (0.979)
Utilization 0.949⇤⇤⇤ 0.933⇤⇤⇤ 0.930⇤⇤⇤
(0.361) (0.345) (0.347)
Share of Thermal Power 0.098 -0.210 -0.082
(0.997) (1.005) (0.997)
GRP 0.016
(0.012)
Industrial Value-added 0.025
(0.020)
Constant -6.152⇤⇤⇤ -6.152⇤⇤⇤ -6.152⇤⇤⇤
(1.545) (1.522) (1.525)
SNCR (Baseline)
SNCR-SCR
Targeted Plant in Key Regions -1.304 -1.473 -1.442
(0.981) (1.028) (1.032)
NOx Control Area -7.828⇤⇤⇤ -7.778⇤⇤⇤ -8.083⇤⇤⇤
(1.425) (1.464) (1.475)
Provincial Target -0.013 -0.044 -0.038
(0.051) (0.043) (0.043)
Capacity 8.302⇤⇤⇤ 9.780⇤⇤⇤ 9.533⇤⇤⇤
(2.245) (2.376) (2.388)
Installation Age 0.027 0.028 0.027
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Selfbuilt -12.81⇤⇤⇤ -13.06⇤⇤⇤ -13.24⇤⇤⇤
(0.453) (0.453) (0.452)
Emission Standard 2.114 1.502 1.601
(2.022) (1.924) (1.942)
Utilization 1.103⇤⇤⇤ 1.074⇤⇤⇤ 1.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.365) (0.348) (0.350)
Share of Thermal Power 6.751⇤⇤⇤ 6.211⇤⇤⇤ 6.604⇤⇤⇤
(2.040) (2.064) (2.070)
GRP 0.040⇤⇤
(0.019)
Industrial Value-added 0.059⇤
(0.034)
Constant -14.97⇤⇤⇤ -15.08⇤⇤⇤ -15.21⇤⇤⇤
(2.772) (2.832) (2.872)
N 1135 1135 1135
Pseudo R2 0.537 0.540 0.539
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SCR
12th FYP -1.822⇤⇤ -1.698⇤⇤ -1.738⇤⇤
(0.776) (0.813) (0.825)
Targeted Plant in 12th FYP -0.258 -0.392 -0.379
(0.735) (0.732) (0.731)
Provincial Target 0.019 0.012 0.014 -0.057⇤⇤ -0.067⇤⇤⇤ -0.066⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
NOx Control Area 1.835⇤ 1.846⇤ 1.831⇤ 1.645 1.674 1.632
(1.060) (1.079) (1.072) (1.060) (1.091) (1.089)
Capacity 17.21⇤⇤⇤ 17.45⇤⇤⇤ 17.35⇤⇤⇤ 16.16⇤⇤⇤ 16.87⇤⇤⇤ 16.79⇤⇤⇤
(1.358) (1.479) (1.457) (1.178) (1.370) (1.353)
Installation Age 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Selfbuilt -0.013 -0.039 -0.024 -0.402 -0.405 -0.383
(0.468) (0.471) (0.471) (0.396) (0.394) (0.398)
Emission Standard -2.713⇤⇤ -2.714⇤⇤ -2.712⇤⇤ -1.671 -1.955⇤ -1.947⇤
(1.123) (1.131) (1.138) (1.177) (1.081) (1.083)
Utilization 0.903⇤⇤⇤ 0.899⇤⇤⇤ 0.899⇤⇤⇤ 0.918⇤⇤ 0.897⇤⇤ 0.896⇤⇤
(0.348) (0.342) (0.345) (0.365) (0.349) (0.351)
Share of Thermal Power -0.799 -0.904 -0.828 0.133 -0.154 -0.026
(1.015) (1.035) (1.023) (0.988) (1.002) (0.994)
GRP 0.007 0.017
(0.013) (0.012)
Industrial Value-added 0.007 0.026
(0.022) (0.020)
Constant -4.242⇤⇤ -4.364⇤⇤ -4.324⇤⇤ -5.917⇤⇤⇤ -5.876⇤⇤⇤ -5.886⇤⇤⇤
(1.766) (1.782) (1.805) (1.446) (1.415) (1.419)
SNCR (Baseline)
SNCR-SCR
12th FYP -5.244⇤ -4.612⇤ -4.886⇤
(2.705) (2.683) (2.732)
Targeted Plant in 12th FYP -12.28⇤⇤⇤ -14.18⇤⇤⇤ -12.49⇤⇤⇤
(0.918) (0.908) (0.911)
Provincial Target 0.239 0.194 0.214 -0.031 -0.062 -0.056
(0.167) (0.166) (0.169) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042)
NOx Control Area -7.239⇤⇤⇤ -7.583⇤⇤⇤ -8.559⇤⇤⇤ -9.418⇤⇤⇤ -10.99⇤⇤⇤ -9.405⇤⇤⇤
(1.578) (1.566) (1.578) (1.233) (1.250) (1.261)
Capacity 9.166⇤⇤⇤ 9.540⇤⇤⇤ 9.366⇤⇤⇤ 7.486⇤⇤⇤ 8.833⇤⇤⇤ 8.605⇤⇤⇤
(2.167) (2.203) (2.210) (2.027) (2.105) (2.111)
Installation Age 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.023 0.024 0.024
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Selfbuilt -11.90⇤⇤⇤ -12.64⇤⇤⇤ -13.46⇤⇤⇤ -13.65⇤⇤⇤ -15.33⇤⇤⇤ -13.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.597) (0.602) (0.603) (0.457) (0.460) (0.458)
Emission Standard 0.404 0.350 0.386 1.666 1.018 1.125
(2.034) (1.996) (2.013) (2.209) (2.128) (2.144)
Utilization 1.046⇤⇤⇤ 1.037⇤⇤⇤ 1.040⇤⇤⇤ 1.065⇤⇤⇤ 1.033⇤⇤⇤ 1.037⇤⇤⇤
(0.351) (0.345) (0.348) (0.368) (0.352) (0.354)
Share of Thermal Power 5.808⇤⇤ 5.577⇤⇤ 5.759⇤⇤ 6.645⇤⇤⇤ 6.112⇤⇤⇤ 6.470⇤⇤⇤
(2.279) (2.256) (2.272) (2.034) (2.081) (2.070)
GRP 0.017 0.038⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.018)
Industrial Value-added 0.016 0.055⇤
(0.031) (0.031)
Constant -12.30⇤⇤⇤ -12.51⇤⇤⇤ -12.46⇤⇤⇤ -14.15⇤⇤⇤ -14.15⇤⇤⇤ -14.27⇤⇤⇤
(2.952) (2.961) (3.001) (2.719) (2.774) (2.788)
N 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135
Pseudo R2 0.543 0.544 0.544 0.536 0.539 0.538
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Comparisons by capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
200MW 300MW 400MW 500MW 600MW 700MW 800MW
SCR
Targeted Plant in Key Regions -0.297 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 6.609⇤⇤⇤ 3.494⇤⇤⇤
(0.516) (0.592) (0.592) (0.592) (0.592) (0.952) (1.160)
Provincial Target -0.054⇤⇤ -0.054⇤⇤ -0.054⇤⇤ -0.054⇤⇤ -0.054⇤⇤ -0.055⇤⇤ -0.055⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
NOx Control Area 1.746⇤ 1.747 1.747 1.747 1.747 1.680 1.680
(1.054) (1.069) (1.069) (1.069) (1.069) (1.051) (1.051)
Capacity 16.37⇤⇤⇤ 16.28⇤⇤⇤ 16.28⇤⇤⇤ 16.28⇤⇤⇤ 16.28⇤⇤⇤ 16.10⇤⇤⇤ 16.10⇤⇤⇤
(1.354) (1.344) (1.344) (1.344) (1.344) (1.149) (1.149)
Installation Age 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Selfbuilt -0.429 -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 -0.410 -0.410
(0.409) (0.405) (0.405) (0.405) (0.405) (0.400) (0.400)
Emission Standard -1.543 -1.509 -1.509 -1.509 -1.509 -1.554 -1.554
(1.047) (1.050) (1.050) (1.050) (1.050) (1.045) (1.045)
Utilization 0.949⇤⇤⇤ 0.929⇤⇤ 0.929⇤⇤ 0.929⇤⇤ 0.929⇤⇤ 0.919⇤⇤ 0.919⇤⇤
(0.361) (0.363) (0.363) (0.363) (0.363) (0.366) (0.366)
Share of Thermal Power 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.095 0.095
(0.997) (0.994) (0.994) (0.994) (0.994) (0.981) (0.981)
Constant -6.152⇤⇤⇤ -6.054⇤⇤⇤ -6.054⇤⇤⇤ -6.054⇤⇤⇤ -6.054⇤⇤⇤ -5.967⇤⇤⇤ -5.967⇤⇤⇤
(1.545) (1.524) (1.524) (1.524) (1.524) (1.504) (1.504)
SNCR (Baseline)
SNCR-SCR
Targeted Plant in Key Regions -1.304 -15.392⇤⇤⇤ -15.392⇤⇤⇤ -15.392⇤⇤⇤ -15.392⇤⇤⇤ -4.249⇤⇤⇤ -6.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.981) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) (1.440) (1.642)
Provincial Target -0.013 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.023 -0.023
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)
NOx Control Area -7.828⇤⇤⇤ -9.063⇤⇤⇤ -9.063⇤⇤⇤ -9.063⇤⇤⇤ -9.063⇤⇤⇤ -11.143⇤⇤⇤ -10.398⇤⇤⇤
(1.425) (1.560) (1.560) (1.560) (1.560) (1.214) (1.214)
Capacity 8.302⇤⇤⇤ 8.678⇤⇤⇤ 8.678⇤⇤⇤ 8.678⇤⇤⇤ 8.678⇤⇤⇤ 7.379⇤⇤⇤ 7.378⇤⇤⇤
(2.245) (2.155) (2.155) (2.155) (2.155) (2.065) (2.064)
Installation Age 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.020 0.020
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Selfbuilt -12.81⇤⇤⇤ -15.54⇤⇤⇤ -15.54⇤⇤⇤ -15.54⇤⇤⇤ -15.54⇤⇤⇤ -15.32⇤⇤⇤ -14.58⇤⇤⇤
(0.453) (0.451) (0.451) (0.451) (0.451) (0.456) (0.456)
Emission Standard 2.114 2.278 2.278 2.278 2.278 2.152 2.152
(2.022) (2.027) (2.027) (2.027) (2.027) (2.042) (2.042)
Utilization 1.103⇤⇤⇤ 1.084⇤⇤⇤ 1.084⇤⇤⇤ 1.084⇤⇤⇤ 1.084⇤⇤⇤ 1.072⇤⇤⇤ 1.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.365) (0.367) (0.367) (0.367) (0.367) (0.369) (0.369)
Share of Thermal Power 6.751⇤⇤⇤ 6.746⇤⇤⇤ 6.746⇤⇤⇤ 6.746⇤⇤⇤ 6.746⇤⇤⇤ 6.749⇤⇤⇤ 6.751⇤⇤⇤
(2.040) (2.032) (2.032) (2.032) (2.032) (2.085) (2.085)
Constant -14.97⇤⇤⇤ -15.10⇤⇤⇤ -15.10⇤⇤⇤ -15.10⇤⇤⇤ -15.10⇤⇤⇤ -14.61⇤⇤⇤ -14.61⇤⇤⇤
(2.772) (2.735) (2.735) (2.735) (2.735) (2.705) (2.705)
N 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135
Pseudo R2 0.537 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.535 0.535
Note: The dummy variables of Targeted Plant in Key Regions in columns (2)–(7) denotes the capacities of 300–800MW,
as shown, have operated for fewer than 20 years as of year 2013, and operated in key regions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Comparisons before and after 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Until 2010 After 2010 Until 2010 After 2010 Until 2010 After 2010
SCR
East 2.517⇤ 0.417 4.346⇤⇤⇤ 0.200 4.409⇤⇤⇤ 0.214
(1.438) (0.394) (1.277) (0.411) (1.301) (0.418)
West 16.413⇤⇤⇤ 1.043 15.04⇤⇤⇤ 1.085 15.89⇤⇤⇤ 1.099
(1.114) (0.874) (1.149) (0.875) (1.153) (0.876)
Capacity 21.19⇤⇤ 17.23⇤⇤⇤ 16.91⇤ 17.49⇤⇤⇤ 16.54⇤ 17.508⇤⇤⇤
(9.132) (1.281) (9.354) (1.345) (9.058) (1.358)
Installation Age 0.016 0.103⇤⇤⇤ -0.004 0.101⇤⇤⇤ -0.009 0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.021) (0.046) (0.022) (0.047) (0.022)
Selfbuilt 9.937⇤⇤⇤ -0.195 10.469⇤⇤⇤ -0.227 11.444⇤⇤⇤ -0.214
(3.676) (0.449) (3.718) (0.451) (3.647) (0.453)
Emission Standard -0.979 -3.149⇤⇤ 0.285 -3.158⇤⇤ 0.478 -3.133⇤⇤
(2.661) (1.490) (2.548) (1.494) (2.527) (1.492)
Utilization 1.254⇤⇤ 0.538 -0.011 0.505 -0.035 0.480
(0.553) (0.429) (0.072) (0.420) (0.057) (0.427)
Share of Thermal Power -4.109⇤ 0.260 -2.990 0.011 -3.305 0.139
(2.466) (1.218) (2.824) (1.299) (2.927) (1.273)
GRP -0.078 0.015
(0.051) (0.017)
Industrial Value-added -0.135 0.025
(0.085) (0.029)
Constant -6.424⇤ -5.195⇤⇤⇤ -0.769 -5.081⇤⇤⇤ -0.586 -5.038⇤⇤
(3.419) (1.986) (4.281) (1.950) (4.171) (1.965)
SNCR (Baseline)
SNCR-SCR
East 17.06⇤⇤⇤ 16.04⇤⇤⇤ 17.83⇤⇤⇤ 14.61⇤⇤⇤ 18.66⇤⇤⇤ 14.63⇤⇤⇤
(1.587) (0.508) (1.417) (0.777) (1.423) (0.819)
West 15.23⇤⇤⇤ 16.52⇤⇤⇤ 13.53⇤⇤⇤ 16.28⇤⇤⇤ 14.43⇤⇤⇤ 16.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.936) (1.505) (0.981) (1.568) (0.971) (1.578)
Capacity 15.25 8.341⇤⇤⇤ 10.054 9.279⇤⇤⇤ 9.822 9.288⇤⇤⇤
(9.298) (2.518) (9.706) (2.498) (9.468) (2.478)
Installation Age -0.130⇤⇤ 0.075⇤ -0.167⇤⇤ 0.069 -0.180⇤⇤ 0.067
(0.052) (0.041) (0.067) (0.043) (0.071) (0.043)
Selfbuilt 10.230⇤⇤⇤ -15.116⇤⇤⇤ 10.729⇤⇤⇤ -15.010⇤⇤⇤ 11.720⇤⇤⇤ -14.874⇤⇤⇤
(3.542) (0.662) (3.558) (0.694) (3.499) (0.699)
Emission Standard 7.275⇤⇤ -5.179⇤⇤ 9.621⇤⇤ -5.041⇤⇤ 10.006⇤⇤ -5.058⇤⇤
(3.383) (2.197) (3.883) (2.295) (3.910) (2.287)
Utilization 1.416⇤⇤ 1.119⇤ 0.152 1.075 0.115 0.952
(0.564) (0.648) (0.126) (0.704) (0.116) (0.690)
Share of Thermal Power 4.432 10.045⇤⇤⇤ 5.507 7.751⇤⇤ 4.869 8.490⇤⇤⇤
(4.698) (3.067) (5.168) (3.266) (5.202) (3.133)
GRP -0.138⇤⇤ 0.054⇤
(0.062) (0.029)
Industrial Value-added -0.246⇤⇤ 0.096⇤
(0.104) (0.056)
Constant -34.03⇤⇤⇤ -31.47⇤⇤⇤ -26.58⇤⇤⇤ -29.87⇤⇤⇤ -27.08⇤⇤⇤ -29.756⇤⇤⇤
(5.775) (3.776) (6.642) (3.560) (6.622) (3.507)
N 178 957 178 957 178 957
Pseudo R2 0.489 0.577 0.526 0.580 0.535 0.580
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: The e↵ects of subsidy on technological choice
(1) (2) (3)
SCR
Subsidy 2011 -0.990⇤⇤ -0.971⇤ -0.971⇤
(0.501) (0.505) (0.504)
Subsidy 2013 -0.571 -0.582 -0.573
(0.468) (0.472) (0.473)
Provincial Target 0.017 0.0072 0.008
(0.039) (0.043) (0.044)
Capacity 16.76⇤⇤⇤ 16.99⇤⇤⇤ 16.97⇤⇤⇤
(1.290) (1.375) (1.374)
Installation Age 0.101⇤⇤⇤ 0.0992⇤⇤⇤ 0.0992⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Selfbuilt 0.035 -0.007 0.005
(0.484) (0.490) (0.490)
Emission Standard -3.223⇤⇤ -3.190⇤⇤ -3.183⇤⇤
(1.575) (1.622) (1.623)
Utilization 0.795⇤ 0.765⇤ 0.753⇤
(0.412) (0.410) (0.416)
Share of Thermal Power -0.851 -1.021 -0.934
(1.039) (1.074) (1.064)
GRP 0.009
(0.016)
Industrial Value-added 0.0146
(0.029)
Constant -4.675⇤⇤ -4.522⇤⇤ -4.505⇤⇤
(2.005) (2.000) (2.011)
SNCR (Baseline)
SNCR-SCR
Subsidy 2011 -1.710⇤ -1.720⇤⇤ -1.722⇤⇤
(0.885) (0.870) (0.867)
Subsidy 2013 -1.106 -1.242 -1.232
(0.815) (0.811) (0.812)
Provincial Target 0.305⇤ 0.119 0.116
(0.177) (0.179) (0.182)
Capacity 8.180⇤⇤⇤ 8.578⇤⇤⇤ 8.514⇤⇤⇤
(2.625) (2.531) (2.521)
Installation Age 0.073 0.069 0.067
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Selfbuilt -10.81⇤⇤⇤ -13.12⇤⇤⇤ -13.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.800) (0.770) (0.767)
Emission Standard -6.084⇤⇤⇤ -5.697⇤⇤⇤ -5.695⇤⇤⇤
(2.139) (2.182) (2.198)
Utilization 2.372⇤⇤⇤ 2.129⇤⇤⇤ 2.049⇤⇤⇤
(0.627) (0.583) (0.568)
Share of Thermal Power 5.168⇤ 3.951 4.660
(3.122) (2.915) (3.038)
GRP 0.051⇤
(0.026)
Industrial Value-added 0.086⇤
(0.050)
Constant -21.21⇤⇤⇤ -17.64⇤⇤⇤ -17.59⇤⇤⇤
(5.988) (4.726) (4.555)
N 957 957 957
Pseudo R2 0.574 0.577 0.576
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
65
Table 3.10: Installation status on 2012: logit models
Dependent variable: Installation2012 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Provincial Target 2012 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.081⇤⇤⇤ 0.074⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
NOx Control Area -0.560⇤ -0.516 -0.505
(0.328) (0.327) (0.328)
Capacity 0.648⇤⇤⇤ 0.574⇤⇤ 0.603⇤⇤ 0.692⇤⇤⇤ 0.615⇤⇤ 0.643⇤⇤
(0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.251) (0.252) (0.251)
Operation Year 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Utilization 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Share of Thermal Power 0.224 0.178 0.115 -0.028 -0.051 -0.107
(0.418) (0.446) (0.447) (0.440) (0.466) (0.466)
GDP -0.025⇤⇤⇤ -0.024⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.007)
Industrial Value-added -0.036⇤⇤⇤ -0.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant -82.79⇤⇤⇤ -79.42⇤⇤⇤ -79.30⇤⇤⇤ -81.49⇤⇤⇤ -78.25⇤⇤⇤ -78.19⇤⇤⇤
(26.44) (25.63) (25.57) (26.25) (25.45) (25.41)
N 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.038 0.035
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: The characteristics of technology choices in new boilers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCR
AgeZero 0.424 0.173 0.634 0.436
(0.440) (0.448) (0.462) (0.436)
Provincial Target -0.046⇤ 0.003 -0.050⇤ -0.041
(0.026) (0.045) (0.027) (0.026)
Capacity 16.63⇤⇤⇤ 17.22⇤⇤⇤ 16.83⇤⇤⇤ 16.94⇤⇤⇤
(1.273) (1.413) (1.343) (1.345)
Operation Time -0.081⇤⇤⇤ -0.082⇤⇤⇤ -0.084⇤⇤⇤ -0.081⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Selfbuilt -0.293 -0.059 -0.254 -0.286
(0.426) (0.479) (0.414) (0.423)
Emission Standard -2.093⇤ -2.857⇤⇤ -2.424⇤⇤ -1.625
(1.084) (1.255) (1.129) (1.074)
Utilization 0.928⇤⇤⇤ 0.925⇤⇤⇤ 0.922⇤⇤⇤ 0.868⇤⇤
(0.353) (0.349) (0.348) (0.343)
capacity share -0.824 -1.290 -0.732 -0.058
(0.955) (1.026) (0.976) (0.953)
GDP 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
12th FYP -1.221
(0.844)
Targeted Plant in 12th FYP -0.950
(0.779)
NOx Control Area 2.614⇤⇤
(1.218)
Constant 157.0⇤⇤⇤ 161.2⇤⇤⇤ 164.1⇤⇤⇤ 155.9⇤⇤⇤
(44.05) (45.02) (44.33) (44.84)
SNCR Baseline
SNCR-SCR
AgeZero -0.674 -1.314 -0.274 -0.672
(0.974) (1.077) (1.000) (0.970)
Provincial Target -0.079 0.193 -0.081⇤ -0.073
(0.048) (0.169) (0.048) (0.048)
Capacity 8.657⇤⇤⇤ 9.749⇤⇤⇤ 8.850⇤⇤⇤ 8.934⇤⇤⇤
(2.069) (2.118) (2.087) (2.122)
Operation Time -0.035 -0.034 -0.039 -0.035
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Selfbuilt -13.672⇤⇤⇤ -12.674⇤⇤⇤ -13.734⇤⇤⇤ -15.552⇤⇤⇤
(0.464) (0.614) (0.466) (0.466)
Emission Standard 0.427 -0.981 0.058 0.709
(1.989) (2.018) (2.053) (2.007)
Utilization 1.099⇤⇤⇤ 1.086⇤⇤⇤ 1.085⇤⇤⇤ 1.029⇤⇤⇤
(0.358) (0.353) (0.353) (0.348)
Share of Thermal Power 6.603⇤⇤⇤ 5.844⇤⇤ 6.488⇤⇤⇤ 6.897⇤⇤⇤
(2.444) (2.580) (2.425) (2.480)
GDP 0.038⇤⇤ 0.015 0.039⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
12th FYP -5.156⇤
(2.886)
Targeted Plant in 12th FYP -12.51⇤⇤⇤
(1.278)
NOx Control Area -10.381⇤⇤⇤
(1.264)
Constant 56.08 56.56 64.40 56.39
(69.28) (71.58) (70.06) (69.84)
N 1135 1135 1135 1135
Pseudo R2 0.539 0.544 0.540 0.544
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.1: Total number of boilers and boilers with NOx control equipment: 2001–2013
Note: Total number of boilers is taken from respective years’ edition of China Electric Power Yearbook. Since the historical
data is available only for boilers with capacity larger than 6MW, it does not coincide with numbers mentioned in Section 1.
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Figure 3.2: Number of boilers starting operations: 1950s–2010s
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Figure 3.3: Number of boilers installed NOx control equipment: 2000–2013
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of boiler capacity for each technology
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of installation age for each technology
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Figure 3.6: First operation year and installation year
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Chapter 4
The e↵ect of Beijing Olympic Games
on air pollution control in thermal
power sector
4.1 Introduction
Air pollution is an important global risk factor for disease. The Health E↵ects Institute
(2017) reports that exposure to PM2.5 is the 5th biggest risk factor for death and is responsible
for 4.2 million deaths from heart disease and stroke, lung cancer, chronic lung disease, and
respiratory infections. The level of pollution is particularly serious in Asian countries: 86% of
the most extreme concentrations (above 75µg/m3) are experienced by populations in China,
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Although stringent environmental policies are necessary
to reduce harmful health risks in these countries, it is often di cult to enforce e↵ective
regulations owing to rapid economic growth and population increases.
In this study, we examine the e↵ect of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (BOG08) on air
pollution control in Beijing and neighboring provinces. As a big event that attracts inter-
national attentions, the Olympic Games o↵er a great opportunity for a country to promote
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ambitious policy for environmental improvement. The Beijing Olympic Committee for the
Games of XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) and the Beijing Municipal Government launched the
“Green Olympics” concept and integrated several environmental targets into the bid with
accelerated deadlines. In particular, air quality improvement was a top priority in plan-
ning for the Games. The actions for air pollution control reduced the Air Pollution Index
(API) in Beijing by 24.9% during the Games, compared with that of 1 year before any
Olympic-motivated actions (Chen et al., 2013).
Several studies have investigated the impact of air quality control during the BOG08.
Chen et al. (2013) use o cially reported API from 2000 to 2009 and show that policy
measures improved the API of Beijing during and shortly after the Games. In addition,
the authors find that most of the improvement in air quality dissipated 1 year after the
Games, suggesting that the improvement was temporary. He et al. (2016) estimate the
e↵ect of air pollution on mortality in China, by using exogenous variations in air quality
during the BOG08. The results show that monthly PM10 concentrations in Beijing were
reduced by approximately 30%. Moreover, the authors find that a 10% reduction in PM10
concentrations is associated with an 8% decrease in the overall mortality rate. Viard and Fu
(2015) evaluate the pollution and labor supply reductions from driving restrictions, including
the period during the BOG08. Based on daily data from multiple monitoring stations, the
authors find that the aggregate API falls 18% during the odd–even policy that restricts cars
to being driven only every other day. However, these studies do not fully address how the
reduction of air pollution was attained in stationary sources, particularly in the thermal
power industry.
This study investigates how pollution reduction is attained in the thermal power industry
during the BOG08. By using data on pollution control equipment and energy intensity,
we examine if there are significant di↵erences in the levels of these measures related to
pollution between the provinces under the regional control policy for the BOG08 and the
other provinces. The results of this study suggest that the installation level of pollution
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control equipment, as well as energy intensity, improved in Beijing and the neighboring
provinces in 2007 and 2008.
This study makes three contributions. First, in contrast to previous studies that examine
the impact of BOG08 on air quality improvement, this study examines the impact of the
Games on control measures of air pollution. Because the control measures are directly re-
lated to the behavior of emission sources, these measures can reveal how emission reduction
is realized as various policies were enforced during the period. Second, this study considers
two activities as control measures: installation of pollution control equipment and energy
intensity. Both are important measures that determine emissions from thermal power plants,
as the former relates to end-of-pipe control and the latter to cleaner production processes.
Third, this study focuses on pollution control in the thermal power industry. Nevertheless,
this industry is a major contributor to air pollution. Wang et al. (2010) analyze pollu-
tion emission reductions during the BOG08 and find that in the pre-Games period, power
plants were the largest contributors to SO2 emissions, which accounted for 11% of total SO2
emissions in Beijing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the background of
study. We introduce a variety of air pollution control policies implemented for BOG08 in a
regional control area. Section 4.3 reports the analysis on the e↵ect of BOG08 on installation
of pollution control equipment. Section 4.4 presents the analysis on the e↵ect of BOG08 on
energy intensity. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Background
In order to bid for China’s Olympic Games, the BOCOG was established in December
2001 (UNEP 2009). The “Green Olympics” concept was launched by the BOCOG and the
Beijing Municipal Government to promote the environmental sustainability of the BOG08.
Air quality was a particular concern, because of the direct impact of poor air on the health
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and performance of the athletes. The measures taken to clear the sky for the Games fall
into the following five areas: reducing energy consumption growth and improving energy
e ciency; closure and relocation of production lines in major industrial industries; emission
reduction in the transportation industry; control of dust from construction; and other special
short-term measures.
The reduction of air pollution from the thermal power industry includes using clean fuels
to replace coal fuels; reducing industrial use of coal; shutting down ine cient power plants,
steel companies, and other petrochemical plants; installation of desulfuration, denitration,
and dust removal equipment for boilers; and promoting the retirement of old boilers. Beijing’s
e↵ort to reduce air pollutants in the thermal power industry for the BOG08 began as early
as late 2002 (Chen et al., 2013). In 2003 and 2004, Beijing reduced its industrial use of coal
by 10 million tons and shut down coal-fired generators at the Capital Steel Company and
Beijing Coking Plant. Between 2005 and 2006, desulfuration, denitration, and dust removal
facilities are constructed at the Beijing Thermal Power Plant and the power plant of Capital
Steel. In addition, Beijing renovated 100% of its boilers for clean fuel in five districts, and
50% in three other districts by late 2006.
As Streets et al. (2007) suggest, neighboring provinces and municipalities, such as Hebei,
Shandong, and Tianjin, significantly contribute to air pollution in Beijing. Recognizing this
point of view, the State Council of China issued “Measures to Ensure Good Air Quality in the
29th Beijing Olympics and Paralympics (MEGA)” policy in October 2007. This is a wider
regional control policy for six provinces, including Beijing and the neighboring provinces of
Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia (He et al., 2016). Beijing and these
neighboring provinces and cities were required to retire outdated production facilities in
power plants and to install desulfurization facilities. The Chinese Ministry of Environmental
Protection coordinated the governments of these provinces and cities to improve air quality
through cooperation (Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2012).
Tianjin government required all thermal power plants to install desulfurization equipment
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before June 2008 (People’s Daily, 2008). Furthermore, the government asked coal boiler to
adopt clean coal (Government of Tianjin, 2008). In Hebei, a closure list was compiled
for small thermal power plants, which were required to close in 2007. In Shijiazhuang, all
coal-fired boilers in Tangshan, Langfang, Baoding (the key regions designated by Hebei gov-
ernment) were required to install desulfurization and dust removal equipment if the capacity
of a boiler was larger than 4 tons. Moreover, all boilers for electricity generation in the key
region were ordered to use clean coal (Government of Hebei, 2007). Shanxi Province is one
of the biggest electricity producers in China. The Shanxi Provincial Government requested
a part of thermal power plants to install desulfurization equipment during the pre-Olympic
Games (i.e., from November 2007 to July 2008). In addition, during the Olympic Games,
the SO2 and NOx discharges in thermal power plants were controlled. Shandong reduced
SO2 emissions by 1.82 million tons in 2007, which is a reduction of 7.12% from the emission
level in 2006. Thermal power plants that failed to achieve the SO2 standards were required
to shut down during the BOG08 (Government of Shandong, 2008). Furthermore, the moni-
toring of air pollution was reinforced during the period (Environmental Protection Bureau of
Shanxi, 2007). In Inner Mongolia, the Provincial Government set regional controls, including
for Huhhot, Baotou, Chifeng, Xilingol, and Ulanqab. Thermal power plants were required
to install desulfurization and denitration equipment or even to close from January 1, 2007
to September 20, 2008 (Government of Inner Mongolia, 2007). These policy measures in
neighboring provinces were important for reducing air pollution in Beijing. Xu et al. (2016)
analyze the impact of air pollution controls in the North China Plain during the BOG08 and
find that a large reduction of PM2.5 was mainly due to regional transportation within the
area beyond Beijing.
In order to estimate the e↵ects of BOG08 on air pollution controls in the thermal power
industry, we set Treatment Area as the provinces under the MEGA policy: Beijing, Tianjin,
Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia. In addition, we set nine provinces neighboring
the Treatment Area as the Control Area: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Gansu, Ningxia,
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Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu. The areas are shown in Figure 4.1.
[Figure 4.1]
4.3 Data
We use two primary data sets for dependent variables throughout our analysis. First, we
use installation of pollution control equipment in the thermal power industry. There are two
types of pollution control equipment examined: a desulfurization system for removing sulfur
and a denitration system for removing nitrogen oxides. Both data types are taken from the
website of the data center of the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection. Second, we
use energy intensity of the thermal power industry. Energy intensity is calculated from the
Compilation of Statistics on Chinese Electric Power Industry (China Electricity Council,
respective years). In addition, we use control variables that might a↵ect installation of
control equipment and energy intensity. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the main
variables.
4.3.1 Pollution control data
Data on pollution control equipment come from the List of Pollution Control Equipment
of Coal-Fired Boilers by the data center of the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection
(2014a, 2014b, 2015).1 The list contains information of 4,659 coal-fired boilers that have
installed desulfurization equipment and 1,135 coal-fired boilers that have installed denitration
equipment. It includes name of each boiler, the province where the boiler is located, the
year when the boiler started operation, the capacity of the boiler, the type of technology of
desulfurization and denitration, the year when the equipment was installed, and the name
of the company that manufactured pollution control equipment. We use information of the
year when the equipment was installed and aggregate the capacity of the boiler that installed
1http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn
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equipment by province for each year from 2003 to 2012. By dividing this number by the total
capacity of boilers that are operating in each province in each year, taken from the China
Energy Statistical Yearbook, we construct provincial-level panel data of the share of boilers
that installed pollution control equipment among all boilers. Table 4.1 provides summary
statistics of the pollution control data. During the study period, the share of boilers with
pollution control equipment is 54.1% for desulfurization equipment and 13.3% for denitration
equipment. Because the implementation of policy to control SO2 started earlier than that
to control NOx, the average share of boilers with desulfurization equipment is higher than
that of boilers with denitration equipment.
[Table 4.1]
4.3.2 Energy intensity data
Energy intensity data come from Compilation of Statistics on Chinese Electric Power
Industry by the China Electricity Council. It contains plant-level information of thermal
power plants in China. We calculate the energy intensity of 4,568 thermal power plants from
2003 to 2012 by dividing total coal consumption of each plant by total electricity generated
by each plant. The mean value of energy intensity of all thermal power plants in China is
409 grams per kWh, regardless whether it the plant generates electricity as its main purpose
or is in other industries, such as steel and chemicals. Approximately 92% of thermal power
plants are coal fired power plant. Energy intensity in a coal-powered plant is usually higher
than in an oil and gas-fired power plant.
4.3.3 Control variables
The pollution control regressions include gross regional production (GRP) per capita,
pollution levy, and electricity price as control variables. GRP per capita is taken from the
China Statistical Yearbook. Pollution levy data in each province are taken from the China
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Environment Yearbook (Editorial Committee of China Environment Yearbook, respective
years). The on-grid electricity prices are taken from the CEIC database (CEIC, 2015).
For the energy intensity regressions, we include self-use, generation, and utilization. Self-
use is a variable that represents percentage of electricity used by the plant in each year.
Generation is the amount of electricity generated by the plant in each year. Utilization is
hours that the plant is in operation in each year. All of these data are taken from Chinese
power industry statistics compilation.
4.4 E↵ect of BOG08 on pollution control
We use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DID) model to estimate the impact of BOG08 on air
pollution controls by thermal power plants. Because the MEGA policy was issued in October
2007 and the Games finished on September 17, 2008, we define the period dummy variable
of BOG08 from 2007 to 2008. The estimation model is represented as follows:
Si = ↵ +  Arear +  T imet +  AreaT imert +  Xi + ✏i, (4.1)
where Si represents the installation share of desulfurization (Share sulfuri) or denitration
(Share nitrogeni) equipment by generation capacity in province i. The share is calculated
by dividing the total capacity of boilers that installed end-of-pipe equipment by the total
capacity of thermal power boilers. Arear is a regional dummy variable. It takes the value
of 1 for six provinces in which the MEGA policy was designated, and 0 otherwise. T imet
is a period dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 for the period from 2007 to 2008, and
0 otherwise. AreaT imert is the cross-term of Arear and T imet to capture the impact of
regional control policy on installation level of end-of-pipe equipment.
In addition, we include several control variables (Xi) in the model, not only to control for
confounding trends but also to reduce the variance of ✏i. We use three control variables in the
model. First, Levyi represents the pollution levy for total pollutants discharged in province
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i. China has applied a pollution levy system to control industrial emissions since 2003. The
benefits of pollution control are expected to increase with higher levels of pollution levy. It
provides stronger incentives for the thermal power industry to install end-of-pipe equipment.
The pollution levy of SO2 emissions increased from 0.42 RMB/kg in 2004 to 1.26 RMB/kg
in 2007 (JES, 2007; OECD, 2007). Second, GRPi indicates the GRP per capita in province
i. It shows the level of economic development in each province. We consider that the share
of boilers with control equipment is higher in developed provinces. Third, Pricei represent
the on-grid electricity price in province i. After Stipulation of Electrical Law was issued
in 1996, power plants were allowed to earn reasonable profits from electricity tari↵s. From
July 2003, a market-based pricing system was introduced in the thermal power industry.
In consideration of average social costs in each province, provincial-specific benchmark on-
grid tari↵s were applied in power generation. The benchmark on-grid tari↵s reflect the
di↵erence in social development, economic development, and energy supply across provinces.
From 2006, under China’s energy conservation and environmental protection policies, on-grid
tari↵s have been used to provide incentives for power producers to phase-out small-sized,
low-e ciency, and high-polluting coal-fired generation units (Ma, 2011). We assume that
a higher on-grid tari↵ is associated with a higher capacity share of end-of-pipe equipment
because of the e ciency e↵ect.
[Figure 4.2]
Figure 4.2 shows the trends in installation of end-of-pipe equipment in the thermal power
industry. The capacity share of desulfurization equipment in Treatment Area is higher than
that in Control Area until 2009 (the year after of the Beijing Olympic Games), but after
2010, becomes lower. The SO2 emissions control policy in China started during the 10th
Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005). Until the end of 2007, 17 GW of thermal power boilers
cumulatively installed desulfurization equipment in Treatment Area. We hypothesize that,
even though the SO2 emissions control policies started earlier than preparations started
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for BOG08, the installation level of desulfurization equipment accelerated because of the
demand for cleaner air during the BOG08 period in Treatment Area than Control Area.
[Figure 4.3]
In contrast to the regulation of SO2 emissions, the government began to control NOx
emissions in the thermal power industry from the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) and
seriously implemented controls from the 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011–2015). Figure 4.3
presents the trends in installation of end-of-pipe equipment in the thermal power industry.
The capacity share of installed denitration equipment in Treatment Area is higher than
that in Control Area from 2007 to 2013.
The results of the simple DID model are presented in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) show
the results for desulfurization equipment; columns (3) and (4) show the results for denitration
equipment. Control variables are included in the models shown in columns (2) and (4). The
cross-term AreaT imert is statistically insignificant in both models for desulfurization and
denitration. This suggests there is no significant impact by BOG08 on the level of end-of-pipe
control.2
[Table 4.2]
In the simple DID model shown above, the serial correlation cannot be dealt with.
Province- and year-specific random e↵ects might cause a clustering problem that a↵ects
statistical inference. Therefore, we also analyze the model in a panel data setting. To con-
sider the small sample size, we use the least square dummy variable method to estimate the
fixed e↵ects. All regional dummy variables and time dummy variables are included in the
model: Dum proi represents the province dummy and Dum yearj is the year dummy.
Sit = ↵ +  AreaT imert +
14X
i=1
⇠iDum proi +
9X
j=1
⌘jDum yearj +  Xit +  i + ✏it, (4.2)
2As a robustness check, we estimate a model setting all other provinces as a control area. The result is
similar to our main analysis and AreaT imert is statistically insignificant.
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Table 4.3 reports the results of the fixed-e↵ects model. The coe cients of AreaT imert are
positive and statistically significant in models for desulfurization equipment when the control
variables are not included, but they are insignificant in models with the control variables.
The coe cients of AreaT imert are positive and statistically significant in all models for
denitration equipment. 3
[Table 4.3]
In order to investigate the e↵ects of regional control policy in each year further, we use a
multiple-period fixed-e↵ects DID model. We introduce AreaDum yearrj, which are interac-
tion terms between Arear andDum yearj. The coe cient of AreaDum yearrj demonstrates
the e↵ects of regional control policy on installed end-of-pipe equipment by each year.
Sit =↵ +
9X
j=1
 jAreaDum yearrj +
14X
i=1
⇠iDum proi
+
9X
j=1
⌘jDum yearj +  i + ✏it,
(4.3)
Figure 4.4 shows the treatment area e↵ect of installed desulfurization equipment for
each year. We use 2006 as the baseline year of this model. The installation e↵ects of
desulfurization equipment are negative but statistically insignificant during 2007–2008 (the
period defined as the MEGA policy in this study). The result suggests that installation
of desulfurization equipment in Treatment Area is not significantly di↵erent from that in
Control Area in these periods. In addition, the figure shows that the impact becomes
negative and statistically significant after 2010. This suggests that, after the BOG08 period,
there is more installation of control equipment in Control Area than in Treatment Area.
[Figure 4.4]
3A similar result is obtained by a robustness check by a model setting all other provinces as a control
area.
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Figure 4.5 reports the result for denitration equipment for each year. The e↵ects on
denitration equipment are statistically insignificant in each year. This suggests that the
treatment area e↵ect in each year is not significantly di↵erent from that in 2006.
[Figure 4.5]
To break down the treatment e↵ects for each province further, we use a multiple-region
fixed-e↵ects DID model. Dum AreaproT imeit is the cross-term of Dum Areaproi and
T imet, where Dum Areaproi is a dummy variable for each province in Treatment Area,
using Beijing as a base category. It captures the di↵erence in installation level of end-of-pipe
equipment in each province of Treatment Area during the BOG08.  i is the coe cient on
the ith province.
Sit =↵ +
5X
i=1
 iDum AreaproT imeit +
14X
i=1
⇠iDum proi
+
9X
j=1
⌘jDum yearj +  i + ✏it,
(4.4)
Figure 4.6 shows the results of the estimation. The e↵ects of BOG08 on desulfurization
equipment is statistically significant only in Tianjin. The installation level of desulfuriza-
tion equipment in Tianjin is 37% lower than in Beijing in 2007 and 2008. The coe cients
for other provinces are statistically insignificant, which suggests that the installation level
of desulfurization equipment in other provinces is not significantly di↵erent from that in
Beijing.4
[Figure 4.6]
Figure 4.7 shows the regional e↵ects of installed denitration equipment. Compare to
Beijing, the e↵ects of BOG08 on installation of denitration equipment are negative and
statistically significant in other provinces. The installation level of denitration equipment in
4If we set T imet as 2008, the desulfurization levels in Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia are higher than
that in Beijing, and the results are statistically insignificant.
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Beijing is 30% higher than other provinces under MEGA policy during the BOG08 period.
Therefore, the positive installation e↵ect for denitration equipment might not be due to the
MEGA policy, but due to the early introduction of these equipment in Beijing.
[Figure 4.7]
In summary, our results suggest that BOG08 does not significantly promote the instal-
lation of pollution equipment. The treatment e↵ect during the BOG08 is not significant in
all models, except for denitration equipment. Furthermore, the BOG08 e↵ect on denitration
might not be due to the regional control policy for the Games, but to early introduction of
equipment in Beijing. One reason might be that the installation of desulfurization equipment
has been promoted as national policy from the 10th Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005), the
period before the BOG08, and the installation of denitration has been promoted from the
12th Five-Year Plan period (2011–2015), the period after the BOG08. Among 1135 thermal
power boilers examined in this study, 37 thermal power boilers installed denitration equip-
ment during the Beijing Olympic Games period (2007–2008) and 958 thermal power boilers
were installed during 2011–2013.
4.5 E↵ect of BOG08 on energy intensity
By using a simple DID model, we estimate the e↵ects of BOG08 on energy intensity.
EIi = ↵ +  Arear +  T imet +  AreaT imert +  Xi + ✏i, (4.5)
The dependent variable EIi represents the energy intensity in thermal power plant i.
It measures how much coal is required to generate one kWh of electricity. Higher energy
intensity means lower energy e ciency of the power plant. The average energy intensity in
our data is 428 g/kwh in Treatment Area, and 392 g/kwh in Control Area.5 Arear is a
5Chinese energy intensity has been improving year by year. In order to control energy intensity, “China
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regional dummy variable that represents plants located in provinces under the MEGA policy.
In our sample, there were 1,246 thermal power plants (approximately 27.28% of all thermal
power plants in China) in Treatment Area and 1,865 thermal power plants (approximately
40.83% of all thermal power plants in China) in Control Area. We set a dummy variable
T imet, which takes the value of 1 if the period is between 2007 and 2008, and 0 otherwise.
AreaT imert indicates the cross-term of Arear and T imet.
Xi represents the control variables. Self usei indicates the auxiliary power consumption
rate in power plant i. A higher number for Self usei means a reduction of the electric-
ity transmitted to grid.6 Reduction of auxiliary power use improves the net unit heat.7
Generationi is the electricity generation of power plant i. Among our sample, 40% of ther-
mal power plants have generation capacity larger than 300 GWh.8 Utilizationi represents
the annual utilization hours in plant i. Longer utilization time means more electricity gen-
eration. The average annual utilization hour in Treatment Area is 4,848 hours, which is
slightly lower than Control Area (5,045 hours).
In addition, we analyze the results with panel data settings. We assume that counterfac-
tual outcomes in the absence of treatment are independent of treatment, and conditional on
an individual  i and covariates Xit. Furthermore, we use a random-e↵ects model, because
the sample size is large enough. Under large N and fixed T asymptotics, any kind of serial
dependence is allowed in the observables and unobservables.
EIit = ↵ +  Arear +  T imet +  AreaT imert +  Xit + ✏it, (4.6)
Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan” was issued by the National Development and Reform
Commission in November 2004 (Ke et al., 2012). Regarding the thermal power industry, the plan set a
target for the Energy Consumption Index (ECI) per unit in the power supply industry to decrease from 392
gce/kwh in 2000 to 320 gce/kwh in 2020.
6The auxiliary power use includes a feed-water system, cooling water system, pollution control system,
combustion air and fuel gas, fuel handing, and other loads.
7The relationship between net heat rate and auxiliary power use can be written as follows: HRnet =
HRcycle
⌘B(1 PssPG )
. HRcycle is turbine cycle heat rate, ⌘B indicates the plants e ciency, and (1   PssPG ) represents
auxiliary power use.
8In China, a plant with generation capacity larger than 300 GWh is defined as a large power plant.
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[Figure 4.8]
Figure 4.8 shows the change in energy intensity during the study period. The energy
intensity level in both areas is steadily decreasing while that in Treatment Area is always
higher than that in Control Area. The figure shows that energy intensity in Treatment Area
dropped sharply in 2007 and came very close to that in Control Area. In Beijing, several
large thermal power plants and 16,000 boilers located in the central area of Beijing were
requested to change to cleaner fuels during the BOG08 period (Beijing Daily, 2008). Tianjin
government requested all coal-fired boilers to use low-sulfur coal based on the following
environmental standard for air pollution emissions: DB12/151-2003. The Hebei Government
asked all coal-fired boilers in Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Langfang, and Baoding to use clean
coal (Government of Hebei, 2007).
[Table 4.4]
Table 4.5 reports the results of pooled ordinary least squares in columns (1) and (2)
and random-e↵ects models in columns (3) and (4). Columns (2) and (4) show the results
with control variables. Arear is positive and statistically significant, which means that the
energy intensity in Treatment Area is significantly higher than that in Control Area. T imet
is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that energy intensity is significantly
improved during the BOG08 period. The cross-term AreaT imert is negative and statistically
significant in the random-e↵ects models, suggesting that energy intensity in Treatment Area
improved during the BOG08 period.9
[Table 4.5]
Next, we use a multiple-period random-e↵ects DID model to estimate the year e↵ects.
EIit =↵ +  Arear +
9X
j=1
 jAreaDum yearrj +
9X
j=1
⌘jDum yearj
+  i + ✏it,
(4.7)
9We obtain similar results for the model with a broader definition of Control Area.
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AreaDum yearrj are the cross-terms of Arear and Dum yearj. These variables capture
the e↵ects of the MEGA policy on energy intensity in each year.  j is the coe cient on the
jth lead or lag.
[Figure 4.9]
Figure 4.9 shows the e↵ects of BOG08 on energy intensity in each year. Compared with
2006, the e↵ect is positive and statistically significant in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Energy
intensity in Treatment Area is reduced to 32.52 g/kWh, 30.28g/kWh, and 20.09 g/kWh in
2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. This can be interpreted as follows: the e↵ect of BOG08
on the improvement of energy intensity lasted for 3 years.
In order to evaluate the e↵ects of BOG08 on energy intensity in each province, we use a
multiple-region random-e↵ects DID model.
EIit =↵ +  T imet +
5X
i=1
 iDum AreaproT imeit +
14X
i=1
⌘Dum proi
+  i + ✏it,
(4.8)
Figure 4.10 shows the e↵ects of BOG08 on energy intensity in each province under the
MEGA policy. The results show that, compared to Beijing, the reduction of energy intensity
in the other five provinces are statistically insignificant during the BOG08 period. This
suggests that the impact of the MEGA policy was not di↵erent among the provinces involved.
[Figure 4.10]
The abovementioned results can be summarized as follows. First, the energy intensity in
Treatment Area is higher than that in Control Area. The results suggest that the energy
intensity of thermal power plants operating in provinces under Treatment Area are higher
than that in other provinces. This might be because provinces in Treatment Area are heavily
polluted. Hebei is a heavily polluted province in the southern area of Beijing and many cities
with poor air quality are located there. Shandong is an important manufacturing province
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and ranked as a province with the third highest GDP in China. Shanxi is the most important
coal-producing province and many coal-fired power plants operate in this region. Second,
energy intensity significantly reduced in Treatment Area during the BOG08 period. Under
the stringent policy, thermal power plants changed their fuel to cleaner fuel and made other
e↵orts to reduce coal consumption. Third, the e↵ects of the BOG08 on cleaner production
processes was sustained until 2008. This is in line with Li et al. (2015), who find that in the
post-Olympic Games period (2009–2012), emission intensity declined by 147% and reduced
overall emissions as much as 24% in Beijing.
4.6 Conclusions
This study has examined the impacts of the BOG08 on pollution control in the Chinese
thermal power industry. Our results indicate that the energy intensity of thermal power
plants improved in 2007 and 2008 in provinces designated as areas requiring coordinated air
pollution control policy for the Olympic Games. On the other hand, such a treatment e↵ect
during the BOG08 is almost negligible for pollution control equipment.
As approaches to reducing pollution, control equipment and improvement in energy inten-
sity have similar but somewhat di↵erent characteristics. Typically, the end-of-pipe control
strategy entails a huge amount of investment and requires considerable fixed costs. Re-
duction of energy intensity, such as using cleaner fuel or reducing waste heat, is relatively
cheaper and a↵ordable even for power plants that do not have enough financial resources.
Our results complement those of Chen et al. (2013) and He et al. (2016), who find a
significant but temporal e↵ect of the BOG08 on air quality improvement. The findings of
our study suggest that energy intensity reduced during the period in the treatment area.
This was because, in many cases, the improvement of energy intensity has persistent e↵ects
over the long term, and the change in thermal power plants might be in contrast to the
temporal e↵ects caused by reduction of tra c volume. Furthermore, the improvement of
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energy intensity reasonably contributed to the improvement of air pollution in the area
although we did not address this topic in this study. To sustain good air quality even after
the Beijing Olympic period, policy that has impacts over a longer time horizon plays an
important role.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for pollution control equipment
VARIABLES Unit N Mean SD Min Max
Share sulfuri % 150 0.541 0.345 0 1.069
Share nitrogeni % 150 0.133 0.224 0 0.960
Arear Dummy 150 0.400 0.492 0 1
T imet Dummy 150 0.200 0.401 0 1
GRPi 10,000 RMB 150 31.11 19.66 6.418 96.61
Levyi Billion RMB 150 0.615 0.508 0.0251 2.633
Pricei RMB 150 0.611 0.087 0.366 0.881
a The unbalanced data are from 2003 to 2012. There are 1,206 thermal power plants served in
around Beijing and surrounding region.
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Table 4.2: The simple DID results for installation of end-of-pipe equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Si Share sulfuri Share sulfuri Share nitrogeni Share nitrogeni
T imet -0.091 -0.021 -0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.061⇤⇤⇤
(0.068) (0.068) (0.022) (0.018)
Arear 0.003 -0.215⇤⇤⇤ 0.052 -0.079⇤⇤
(0.068) (0.058) (0.045) (0.034)
AreaT imert 0.098 0.063 0.078 0.086
(0.097) (0.094) (0.098) (0.077)
GRPi 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Levyi 0.219⇤⇤⇤ -0.057⇤
(0.043) (0.030)
Pricei -0.429 -0.225
(0.266) (0.139)
Constant 0.550⇤⇤⇤ 0.442⇤⇤ 0.130⇤⇤⇤ 0.083
(0.047) (0.178) (0.022) (0.086)
N 150 150 150 150
R2 0.008 0.346 0.055 0.491
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The robust option is used on all of the models. Control variables are used in columns (2) and (4).
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Table 4.3: The fixed e↵ects DID results in installed end-of-pipe equipment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sit Share sulfuri Share sulfuri Share nitrogeni Share nitrogeni
AreaT imert 0.098⇤ 0.077 0.078⇤ 0.115⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.055) (0.046) (0.049)
GRPit -0.005⇤ 0.005⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002)
Levyit 0.067 -0.199⇤⇤⇤
(0.049) (0.070)
Priceit -0.227 0.167
(0.144) (0.127)
Constant -0.045 0.333 0.438⇤⇤⇤ 0.051
(0.104) (0.211) (0.118) (0.221)
N 150 150 150 150
R2 0.902 0.906 0.804 0.833
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The robust option is used on all of the models. Control variables are used in columns (2) and (4). Year
dummy variables and province dummy variables are usually used.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for energy intensity
VARIABLES Unit N Mean SD Min Max
EIi g/kwh 13,274 409.4 247.8 6 17,494
Arear Dummy 13,275 0.472 0.499 0 1
T imet Dummy 13,275 0.218 0.413 0 1
Utilizationi h 13,275 4,888 1,953 2 8,760
Self useit % 12,939 9.091 5.016 0 85
Generationit GWh 13,273 1,254 2,554 0.0200 66,536
a The unbalanced data are from 2003 to 2012. There are 1,206 thermal power plants served
in around Beijing and surrounding regions. [b] The minimum value of Utilizationi equals
0 because the sets are backup plants.
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Table 4.5: Simple and random-e↵ects DID results in energy intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EIi POLS POLS RE RE
Arear 37.54⇤⇤⇤ 16.65⇤⇤⇤ 52.71⇤⇤⇤ 39.97⇤⇤⇤
(5.330) (5.211) (13.27) (13.21)
T imet -9.621⇤⇤ -10.05⇤⇤ 36.50⇤⇤⇤ 33.08⇤⇤⇤
(4.813) (4.226) (5.107) (4.475)
AreaT imert -11.06 -1.522 -20.27⇤⇤⇤ -15.85⇤⇤
(8.490) (7.989) (6.873) (6.792)
Self usei 12.66⇤⇤⇤ 5.309⇤⇤⇤
(0.797) (0.863)
Generationi -0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Utilizationi 0.001 -0.0001
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 394.9⇤⇤⇤ 296.2⇤⇤⇤ 352.5⇤⇤⇤ 314.7⇤⇤⇤
(2.579) (11.69) (5.237) (11.83)
N 13,274 12,936 13,274 12,936
R2 0.006 0.094
R2b 0.043 0.074
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The robust option is used on all of the models. Control variables are
used in columns (2) and (4). Year dummy variables and province dummy
variables are used in random-e↵ects models.
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Figure 4.1: The set of Treatment Area and Control Area
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Figure 4.2: The share of desulfurization equipment in thermal power sector which in
Treatment Area
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Figure 4.3: The share of denitration equipment in the thermal power industry in
Treatment Area
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Figure 4.4: Result of installed desulfurization equipment e↵ects of multiple-period model
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Figure 4.5: Result of installed denitration equipment e↵ects of multiple-period model
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Figure 4.6: Result of installed desulfurization equipment e↵ects of multiple-region model
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Figure 4.7: Result of installed denitration equipment e↵ects of multiple-region model
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Figure 4.8: Trend of energy intensity decreasing
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Figure 4.9: Result of reduced energy intensity e↵ects in each year
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Figure 4.10: Result of reduced energy intensity e↵ects in each province
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Chapter 5
Conlusions
This thesis examined policies that control various air pollutants in the Chinese thermal
power sector. We investigate the e↵ectiveness of air pollution control from three points of
view: enforcement of commend and control policies; technology choice for pollution control;
and the impact of the Beijing Olympic Games on air pollution control.
First, in order to reduce emissions of air pollutants, the policies for installing control
equipment and closure of small coal-fired power plants were e↵ective. On the other hand, the
e↵ectiveness of FGD equipments di↵ers across the country. Because of improved monitoring
and enforcement by environmental departments, the gap regarding the e↵ectiveness of FGD
equipment among provinces will converge as income levels increase.
Second, the results of this thesis suggest that the power plants have some flexibility in
choosing a preferred technology to reduce NOx emissions. Therefore, it is possible that plants
choose the cheapest technology to lower their investment costs, since the subsidy does not
depend on the technology option chosen.
Lastly, BOG08 might have had the e↵ect of improving the energy intensity of the ther-
mal power sector. Energy saving actions, such as using cleaner fuel, and strengthening
management of coal-use, are relatively cheaper and a↵ordable, even for power plants. Such
improvement of energy intensity might have an impact on better air quality over a longer
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term than those attained by the temporal restriction of tra c volume.
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